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INTRODUCTION
F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans.1 This June 2005
headline announced the arrival of BiDil, a heart failure medication that is
approved for African-Americans only.2 BiDil is the first drug in
pharmaceutical history that will constitute standard therapy for only one
particular “race.”3
Health care professionals are becoming increasingly interested in “racebased” medicine in the research and therapeutic contexts.4 Many
researchers are attempting to discern “racial” differences in disease
manifestation, biological functioning, and therapeutic response rates.5 As
this approach develops, physicians may prescribe different dosages of
medication for people of separate “races”6 or may provide them with
entirely different drugs. In light of the success of BiDil, investigators are
also likely to pursue the development of additional “racially-tailored”
medications.7 In fact, several academic and professional conferences have
1. Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2005, at C2.
2. Id.; see also BiDil Package Insert, p. 9 (on file with author) (stating that “BiDil is
indicated for the treatment of heart failure as an adjunct to standard therapy in self-identified
black patients to improve survival, to prolong time to hospitalization for heart failure, and to
improve patient-reported functional status”).
3. Id. See generally infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (detailing the history
and development of BiDil as a “racially-tailored” drug).
4. See C. Condit & B. Bates, How Lay People Respond to Messages About Genetics,
Health, and Race, 68 CLINICAL GENETICS 97, 97 (2005) (observing that “[t]here is a growing
movement in medical genetics research and practice to develop, implement, and promote a
model of race-based medicine”).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 49-66 (appraising several studies that focus on
“racial” differences).
6. See Sally Satel, I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 6, at
56 (describing certain circumstances under which “race” is considered in determining
treatment).
7. Cf. Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS, 1, 25
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already devoted significant time to the discussion of “race-based”
medicine. On April 18, 2005, the University of Minnesota hosted a
conference entitled Proposals for the Responsible Use of Racial & Ethnic
Categories in Biomedical Research: Where Do We Go From Here?8
Likewise, the Eighth World Congress on Clinical Pharmacology and
Therapeutics, held in 2004 in Brisbane, Australia, devoted an afternoon to
ethnopharmacology.9
While “racial profiling” in medicine has generated significant discussion
in medical and bioethics circles, it has thus far gained relatively little
attention in legal literature.10 This Article aims to develop the discourse
concerning this important topic. It argues that “race-based” medicine is an
inappropriate and perilous approach. The argument is rooted partly in the
fact that the concept of “race” is elusive and has no reliable definition in
medical science, the social sciences, and the law.11 Does “race” mean
color, national origin, continent of origin, culture, or something else? What
about the millions of Americans who are of mixed ancestral origins12—to
what “race” do they belong? To the extent that “race” means “color” in
colloquial parlance, should physicians decide what testing to conduct or
treatment to provide based simply on their visual judgment of the patient’s
skin tone? “Race,” consequently, does not constitute a valid and sensible
foundation for research or therapeutic decision-making.
Further, this Article contends that “racial profiling” in medicine can be
dangerous to public health and welfare.13 A focus on “race,” whatever its
meaning in the physician’s eye, can lead to medical mistakes if the doctor
(2004) (arguing that correlating disease and “race” is growing in popularity as drug
companies seek to tailor therapies to the genetic profiles of both individuals and groups).
8. See Conference at the University of Minnesota, Proposals for the Responsible Use
of Racial and Ethnic Categories in Biomedical Research: Where Do We Go From Here?
(Apr. 18, 2005), http://lifesci.consortium.umn.edu/conferences/catego
ries.php?s=0 (critically examining both the current and historical use of “racial” and
“ethnic” categories in biomedical and pharmaceutical research).
9. Taslin Rahemtulla & Raj Bhopal, Pharmacogenetics and Ethnically Targeted
Therapies, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 1036-37 (2005).
10. A Westlaw search revealed very few major law review articles discussing BiDil.
See Kahn, supra note 7; Rene Bowser, Race As A Proxy for Drug Response: The Dangers
and Challenges of Ethnic Drugs, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2004); Erik Lillquist &
Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 391 (2004); Kevin Outterson, Tragedy and Remedy: Reparations for
Disparities in Black Health,
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
(2005).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 101-106 (demonstrating the historical ambiguity
of the term “race”).
12. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE, COMBINATIONS OF TWO RACES, AND NOT HISPANIC
OR LATINO: 2000 [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE], http://factfinder
.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPeople?_sse=on (follow “Race, Combinations of Two Races”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (disclosing that in the 2000 census almost seven
million Americans indicated that they were members of two or more “races”).
13. See infra notes 171-175 and accompanying text (underscoring the dangers of “racial
profiling” in diagnosing and treating illness).
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misjudges the patient’s ancestral identity or fails to recall that a particular
condition affects several vulnerable groups and not just one “race.” The
phenomenon can also lead to stigmatization and discrimination in the
workplace and elsewhere if the public perceives certain “races” as more
diseased or more difficult to treat than others. In addition, “racial
profiling” could exacerbate health disparities by creating opportunities for
health professionals to specialize in treating only one “race” or to provide
different and inferior treatment to certain minorities. It could also intensify
African-Americans’ distrust of the medical profession. Finally, “racebased” medicine might violate numerous anti-discrimination provisions
contained in federal law, state law, and federal research regulations and
guidelines.14
The Article does not argue that attribute-based research and treatment
mechanisms should be abandoned. Rather, to the extent that a grouporiented approach is pursued, it should be attribute-based rather than “racebased,” and scientists should invest considerable effort in accurately
identifying the attribute or attributes at issue. Health status and treatment
response depend on a constellation of factors, all of which must be
considered. The variables that might be relevant for a particular procedure
or therapy could include socioeconomic status, diet, exercise, stress level,
exposure to environmental toxins, cultural and religious barriers to
treatment compliance, specific genetic alterations that influence disease
course or disease vulnerability, and other factors.15 In the future, it is likely
that affordable genetic technology will be widely available to screen
individuals for thousands of genetic variations.16 Ideally, the practice of
medicine will become increasingly individualized, with physicians
14. See infra Part IV (discussing the legality of “racially-tailored” medicine under
various anti-discrimination laws).
15. See Ian Hacking, Why Race Still Matters, 134 DAEDALUS 102, 109 (2005) (stating
that BiDil’s success with the African-American population may have “less to do with the
inherent constitution of their cardiovascular systems than with a mixture of social factors”);
see also Alexandra E. Shields et al., The Use of Race Variables in Genetic Studies of
Complex Traits and the Goal of Reducing Health Disparities: A Transdisciplinary
Perspective, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 77, 96 (2005) (recommending direct measurement of
“specific social dimensions known to have an impact on health and health outcomes”
instead of using “race” as a blanket category for “social, economic, and environmental
factors that disproportionately affect minority populations in the United States”); Margaret
A. Winker, Measuring Race and Ethnicity: Why and How?, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1612,
1614 (2004) (encouraging investigators to measure a number of different variables,
including “socioeconomic status, education, urban vs. rural location, or income region by
ZIP code” in order to accurately assess the outcome at issue).
16. See Michael Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic
Profiling in Drug Development, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 31, 40-41 (2002) (stating
that small chips embedded with DNA “can be used to test the samples of individuals for the
presence of thousands of identified genetic variations and, alternatively, to screen hundreds
of thousands of individuals with a shared phenotype characteristic to isolate and identify
shared genetic expression”).
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examining patients for multiple variables that will determine which therapy
should be prescribed.17 With careful attention to accurate identification of
the patient groups that will benefit from various treatment alternatives,
attribute-based medicine could undoubtedly make a significant contribution
to public health.
In order to safeguard against the hazards of “racially-tailored” medicine,
certain precautions must be implemented. These involve careful scrutiny
on the part of governmental and institutional reviewers of study protocols,18
vigilance and prudence on the part of medical practitioners, and restraint on
the part of researchers, research institutions, and the media in
communicating information concerning attribute-based studies and
therapies to the public.19
A few notes about terminology are in order. I have argued previously
that the term “race” should be eliminated from the law because it is both
meaningless and pernicious.20 In this Article the emphasis is different. I
will extensively analyze the risks and dangers of basing medical research
and therapeutic decisions on “race.” Because the concept of “race” is
amorphous and not precisely definable, I will place quotes around the term
when its use is necessary to describe existing medical practices or attitudes.
When I can avoid reference to “race” or “racial,” I will speak in terms of
“ancestry,” “population,” “attribute-based” or some other appropriate term.
I have chosen the phrase “attribute-based medicine” to describe an
approach that is preferable to “race-based” medicine. The attributes upon
which researchers and health care providers might focus include genetic
makeup, socio-economic status, health habits such as diet, exercise, or
smoking, religious and cultural beliefs that could constitute barriers to
treatment compliance, and other factors.21 These characteristics are
precisely and objectively definable, and their presence or absence in
individuals can be verified through testing or inquiry. While “race” could
17. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (defining “individualized” medical
treatment as a method of medical evaluation in which several treatment options will be
available for a given condition). The selection of the appropriate alternative will depend on
a number of factors, such as diet, genetic make-up, and prior medical history.
“Individualized” medical treatment does not mean, however, that medications will be
developed for each individual patient, since this would obviously be impractical.
18. See THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RES., CDER HANDBOOK 15-16
(1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/ (describing the FDA’s role in the
drug approval process). See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.107-56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.10746.111 (2005) (describing the function and scope of Institutional Review Boards and their
authority).
19. See infra notes 360-367 and accompanying text (cautioning researchers and the
media that information about “racial” differences is often distorted).
20. See Sharona Hoffman, Is There A Place for Race As A Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1094 (2005) (arguing that “race” is a vague and unreliable term without value as a
legal concept).
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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be considered an attribute, I will explain at length why it should not be the
focus of medical research and practice.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I of the Article will describe
“race-based” research and therapeutic practices and will examine the
growing interest in “race-based” medicine and the reasons for it. Part II
will argue that “race” is a concept that has no coherent meaning and that is
potentially pernicious. Part III will focus on the dangers of “raciallytailored” medicine, and Part IV will analyze a variety of anti-discrimination
mandates that could potentially be violated by the practice. Finally, Part V
will detail recommendations for the development of attribute-based
medicine in a manner that will promote the health and welfare of all
population groups.
I. “RACE-BASED” RESEARCH AND THERAPEUTIC PRACTICES
A. The Story of BiDil
BiDil is a combination of two drugs, hydralazine and isosorbide dinitrate
(“H/I”).22 These drugs are vasodilators that dilate blood vessels in order to
diminish the stress on the heart as it pumps blood.23 BiDil also increases
nitric oxide levels in the blood, which is believed to benefit many heart
failure patients.24
The evolution of BiDil began with the first Vasodilator Heart Failure
Trial (“V-HeFT I”),25 which was conducted from 1980 to 1985 and found
that the H/I drug combination (BiDil’s components) reduced mortality,
though the results were of “borderline statistical significance.”26 A second
trial, V-HeFT II, took place between 1986 and 1991 and compared the H/I
combination to enalapril, an ACE inhibitor.27 This study showed that
22. See Saul, supra note 1, at C2 (discussing BiDil and its components).
23. Bowser, supra note 10, at 1116-17.
24. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 8 (emphasizing that nitric oxide is generally considered
to be beneficial to patients suffering from heart failure); see also NitroMed, Background on
BiDil, http://www.nitromed.com/bildil/docs/heartfailur
e.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (postulating that heart failure can be associated with nitric
oxide deficiency).
25. Jay N. Cohn et al., Effect of Vasodilator Therapy on Mortality in Chronic
Congestive Heart Failure: Results of a Veterans Administration Cooperative Study, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1547, 1547 (1986).
26. Kahn, supra note 7, at 12; see Cohn et al., supra note 25, at 1547.
27. See Jay N. Cohn et al., A Comparison of Enalapril with Hydralazine-Isosorbide
Dinitrate in the Treatment of Chronic Congestive Heart Failure, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED.
303, 303-04 (1991). Angiotensin converting enzymes, or ACE inhibitors, as they are
commonly called, are drugs that lower blood pressure by inhibiting the formation of
angiotensin, a substance that causes the arteries to constrict. See Mary Duenwald, Familiar
Blood Pressure Drug Finds an Array of Novel Uses, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at F1
(describing the many uses and benefits of ACE inhibitors); Angiotensin-converting Enzyms
(ACE) Iinhibitors (Systemic), MedlinePlus, available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
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enalapril was generally more effective than the H/I combination and
established ACE inhibitors as the drugs of choice for heart failure,28 though
twenty to thirty percent of congestive heart failure patients could not
tolerate them or did not respond to them and, therefore, were found to be
better treated by the H/I combination.29 The V-HeFT trials enrolled both
Black and White subjects and did not scrutinize or report any “racial”
distinctions in drug response rates.30 In 1989, Dr. Jay Cohn, one of the
trials’ principal investigators, received a patent for the H/I drugs.31 His
patent application did not mention “race” or indicate that the medications
should be targeted for any particular ethnic population.32
The H/I drugs were combined into one pill, known as BiDil, and Medco,
which had acquired the intellectual property rights to BiDil from Cohn,
submitted a new drug application to the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) in 1996.33 The FDA, however, voted nine to three against BiDil’s
approval because it lacked confidence in the biostatistical validity of the VHeFT studies’ results.34 Medco thereafter allowed its intellectual property
rights to revert to Cohn.35
In an effort to revive the drug, Cohn re-analyzed the V-HeFt data,
focusing on “race.”36 In 1999 Cohn and other scientists published a paper
in which they wrote that “the H-I combination appears to be particularly
effective in prolonging survival in black patients and is as effective as
enalapril in this subgroup. In contrast, enalapril shows its more favorable
effect on survival, particularly in the white population.”37
In 1999 NitroMed Inc. acquired the intellectual property rights to BiDil
from Jay Cohn.38 NitroMed amended BiDil’s new drug application to seek
medlineplus/druginfo/uspdi/202044.html. ACE inhibitors relax the arteries, thereby
lowering blood pressure and improving the pumping efficiency of failing hearts. Id.
28. Cohn et al., supra note 27, at 307-09.
29. Id.; see Kahn, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that current guidelines still recommend
the H/I combination for the 1.5 million patients annually who do not respond well to ACE
inhibitors).
30. See Cohn et al., supra note 27, at 303-04.
31. Kahn, supra note 7, at 13.
32. See id. (specifying that Cohn applied for a patent on a “method of reducing
mortality associated with congestive heart failure using hydralazine and isosorbide
dinitrate”). Cohn’s patent contained no mention of “race.” Id.
33. Bowser, supra note 10, at 1118. In 1994, BiDil was tested to ascertain whether the
new pill was as effective as the H/I drugs when administered separately. Id.
34. Id. On the day following the FDA’s decision, Medco’s stock plummeted twentyfive percent. Id.
35. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 15-16 (describing Medco’s decision to abandon BiDil
after the FDA’s rejection of the drug).
36. Peter Carson et al., Racial Differences in Response to Therapy for Heart Failure:
Analysis of the Vasodilator-Heart Failure Trials, 5 J. CARDIAC FAILURE 178, 182 (1999).
37. Id.
38. Bowser, supra note 10, at 1119. NitroMed is a “Boston area biotech firm
specializing in the development and commercialization of nitric oxide enhanced medicines”
to treat heart disease. Id.
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approval for the use of BiDil to treat African-American heart failure
patients. In 2001 the FDA indicated that it would most likely approve the
drug if a clinical trial proved its efficacy for Black patients.39 This
conditional promise led to the African-American Heart Failure Trial (“AHeFT”), which enrolled 1,050 self-identified African-Americans40 and was
supported by the Association of Black Cardiologists and $31.4 million
raised from private venture capital firms.41
On October 15, 2002, Cohn and his co-author, Peter Carson, obtained a
new patent for the use of BiDil to treat African-American patients and
assigned the patent rights to NitroMed.42 The patent is “the first ever
granted to a preexisting drug for a new, race-specific use.”43 While Cohn’s
original 1989 patent for the H/I drugs is scheduled to expire in 2007, the
second, “race-based” patent will not expire until 2020.44
The study was halted early when it became evident that the addition of
BiDil to standard therapy reduced one-year mortality by forty-three percent
among the Black study participants.45 The investigators determined that it
would be unethical to continue to deprive subjects in the control arm of the
drug.46 The study results were published in the prestigious New England
Journal of Medicine in November 2004,47 and BiDil was approved by the
FDA in June 2005.48 The emergence of BiDil may well usher in a new era
of “racially-tailored” medicine.
B. “Race-Based” Research
The question of whether there are biological and medical differences
39. Gregg M. Bloche, Race-Based Therapeutics, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2035, 2036
(2004).
40. See Anne L. Taylor et al., Combination of Isosorbide Dinitrate and Hydralazine in
Blacks with Heart Failure, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2050 (2004) (describing the study’s
exclusion and inclusion criteria). The study also defined “black” as being of African
descent. Id.; cf. infra note 131 and accompanying text (explaining that skin color is an
unreliable indicator of an individual’s ancestry).
41. Nicholas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004,
§ 2, at 12; see NitroMed Completes $31.4 Million Private Financing, PR Newswire, June
14, 2001 (reporting that the money was raised primarily to support clinical and regulatory
development and enabled NitroMed to complete the A-HeFT study).
42. Kahn, supra note 7, at 31-32; see U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463 (filed Sept. 8, 2000)
(issued Oct. 15, 2002) (naming Cohn and Carter as the inventors and NitroMed, Inc. as the
assignee of the patent).
43. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036 (emphasizing the financial benefit that lured
NitroMed to pursue the manufacture of a “race-specific” drug).
44. Id.
45. Taylor, supra note 40, at 2049; accord Wade, supra 41, § 2, at 12.
46. See Wade, supra note 41, § 2, at 12 (reporting that the study had to be stopped
because the drug was so effective that it seemed unethical to deny it to members of the
control group).
47. See Taylor, supra note 40, at 2049 (stating that the study has not been replicated by
anyone without financial interests in BiDil).
48. Saul, supra note 1, at C2.
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among members of different “races” has long fascinated scientists.49
Biomedical researchers have conducted numerous clinical studies that
focus on “racial” differences in disease manifestation, metabolism, and
treatment response rates.50 Moreover, even when studies are not designed
specifically to examine “racial” differences, data about the “racial”
identities of subjects is often collected.51 Many of the findings, however,
are controversial and are vigorously debated in medical circles.52
For example, a 1999 study claimed that Blacks metabolize nicotine more
slowly than Whites.53 Critics pointed to several flaws in the study,
including the enrollment of only fifty-one Blacks, the likelihood that
Blacks smoked menthol cigarettes in far greater numbers than Whites, and
the insubstantial statistical difference.54
Other studies have focused on hypertension and have purported to find
that Blacks have higher rates of hypertension.55 Upon careful scrutiny,
however, it becomes evident that while African-Americans do demonstrate
higher blood pressure measurements than North American Whites, Whites
have higher levels than Nigerians56 and Jamaicans, and the data from
Brazil, Trinidad, and Cuba show a much smaller blood pressure disparity
than the statistics from North America.57 Overall, in the populations
studied, between fourteen and forty-four percent of Blacks were found to
have hypertension, while in Whites, the prevalence rate ranged from

49. See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text (describing the history of the medical
profession’s fascination with the concept of “racially-tailored” medicine).
50. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 393 (highlighting two studies that
focused on the possible differences in drug responses based on “race,” while noting that
other examples are readily available).
51. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 16 (stating that “the V-HeFT investigators had been
tracking data by race from the outset” long before they conceived of BiDil as a “raciallytailored” drug). The observation that “race” identification data is routinely collected in
clinical trials is confirmed by the author’s personal experience as a member of an IRB.
52. See generally Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 393 nn.15-17 (citing several
studies evaluating a range of claims regarding “racial” differences).
53. Neal L. Benowitz et al., Ethnic Differences in N-Glucuronidation of Nicotine and
Cotinine, 291 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 1196 (1999). The study
included 108 volunteers, fifty-one of whom were Black and fifty-seven of whom were
White. The subjects were similar in age, gender distribution, and smoking history. Id.
54. See Bowser, supra note 10, at 1125 (stating that the differences in metabolism were
not substantial, and that “there was only an eight percent difference in the variable of
interest”). Bowser claims that fifty-seven of the subjects were African-American, but has
apparently inverted the number of Black and White participants. Benowitz et al., supra note
53.
55. Richard S. Cooper et al., An International Comparative Study of Blood Pressure in
Populations of European vs. African Descent, 3 BMC MED. 2 (2005), available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/ (follow “journals A-Z” hyperlink; then follow “BMC
Medicine” hyperlink; then follow Article 3:2 hyperlink);
Troy Duster, Race and
Reification in Science, 307 SCI. 1050, 1050 (2005); Gregory M. Lamb, A Place For Race in
Medicine?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 3, 2005, at 14.
56. Cooper et al., supra note 55.
57. Duster, supra note 55, at 1050.
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twenty-seven to fifty-five percent.58 Another epidemiological study found
that even among African-Americans there are notable hypertension
differences, with darker skinned American Blacks manifesting more
serious symptoms than lighter skinned African-Americans.59
The
researchers concluded that the differences could be explained by
socioeconomic factors, since those with darker skin in America suffer more
discrimination and deprivation than those with lighter skin.60
In 1999 Peter Carson, Daniel Dries, and others coauthored a study, the
results of which indicated that “there may be differences in the natural
history of . . . left ventricular dysfunction between black and white
patients” and thus in the evolution of progressive heart failure.61 The
authors also asserted that “[t]he population-based mortality rate from
congestive heart failure is 1.8 times as high for black men as for white men
and 2.4 times as high for black women as for white women.”62 This study
has been sharply criticized for failing to control adequately for socioeconomic factors63 and for reaching erroneous statistical results.
Specifically, critics note that the study relied on data from 1981 even
though the gap between Black and White mortality rates had significantly
narrowed between 1980 and 1995.64 Furthermore, the study examined only
individuals between the ages of thirty-five and seventy-four, even though
among Whites who die of heart failure, seventy-one percent do so after the
age of seventy-four.65 According to one commentator, current data places
“the age-adjusted ratio of black to white mortality from heart failure . . .
under 1.1:1 for 1999.”66
In the world of “racially-tailored” research, the A-HeFT trial is a
milestone.67 It was the first prospective study designed specifically to
58. Cooper et al., supra note 55.
59. Michael J. Klag et al., The Association of Skin Color With Blood Pressure in U.S.
Blacks With Low Socioeconomic Status, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 599, 599 (1991).
60. See id. at 602 (studying whether the association of skin color with blood pressure is
linked to the social and economic stress faced by many individuals with darker skin color).
61. Daniel L. Dries et al., Racial Differences in the Outcome of Left Ventricular
Dysfunction, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 609, 616 (1999).
62. Id. at 609.
63. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 19-20 (expressing concern that Dr. Dries’ study failed to
include variables such as diet, environment, exercise, and stress, many of which have a
strong correlation with “race”).
64. Id. at 20; Jonathan Kahn, Getting the Numbers Right, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED.
473, 477 (2003).
65. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 21 (contending that Dr. Dries’ failure to include the agespecific qualification of the study from which he took his data compromised the significance
of his findings); see also Duster, supra note 55, at 1050 (noting that “[t]he age group 45 to
64 only accounts for about 6% of heart failure mortality, and for those over 65, the statistical
difference between ‘African-Americans and Caucasians’ nearly completely disappears”).
66. Kahn, supra note 7, at 21; Kahn, supra note 64, at 477.
67. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (describing the A-HeFt trial and the
FDA’s approval of BiDil).
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prove the efficacy of a drug that would be recommended only for members
The A-HeFT study has been particularly
of a single “race.”68
69
controversial. The trial included only self-identified African-Americans
and compared a combination of BiDil and standard therapy (which includes
ACE inhibitors) to standard therapy alone for this population.70 No trial
has ever compared a combination of BiDil and ACE inhibitors to standard
therapy among all populations, and therefore, according to critics, it is
erroneous to conclude that BiDil combined with conventional therapy is the
treatment of choice only for African-Americans.71 The V-HeFT trials that
preceded A-HeFT72 compared BiDil, on its own, to conventional therapy
that was used in the early 1980s and then to enalapril (an ACE inhibitor)
alone.73 No previous trial ever tested a combination of BiDil and ACE
inhibitors. Consequently, if non-Blacks are not given BiDil together with
ACE inhibitors because the FDA has not approved it for them, they might
be deprived of a beneficial treatment.74 On the other hand, if doctors
prescribe BiDil off-label75 to non-Black patients, which might be what its
manufacturers hope for, these individuals will be receiving a drug
combination that was never tested within their population group.

68. Bloche, supra note 39, at 2035; accord Susan J. Landers, New Drug Combo
Intensifies Race-Based Medicine Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 6, 2004. Other trials have
been conducted to compare treatment outcomes between Black and non-Black patients with
therapies that are marketed to all population groups. See, e.g., Jackson T. Wright, Jr. et al.,
Outcomes in Hypertensive Black and Nonblack Patients Treated with Chlorthalidone,
Amlodipine, and Lisinopril, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1595 (2005) (finding that “[w]hile the
improved outcomes with chlorthalidone were more pronounced for some outcomes in
blacks than in nonblacks, thiazide-type diuretics remain the drugs of choice for initial
therapy of hypertension in both black and nonblack hypertensive patients”).
69. See Pilar Ossorio & Troy Duster, Race and Genetics, 60 AM. PSYCH. 115, 116
(2005) (emphasizing that the “racialized” nature of the BiDil trial remains very
controversial).
70. Taylor, supra note 40, at 2049.
71. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2035 (commenting that by only enrolling selfidentified blacks, the A-HeFT study did nothing to test whether or not adding the H/I
combination to conventional therapy would benefit other population groups); see also Kahn,
supra note 64, at 481 (noting that the A-HeFT study provided no data with which to
determine whether BiDil is effective in non-African Americans).
72. See supra Part I.A (describing the V-HeFT trials).
73. Bowser, supra note 10, at 1117; see supra notes 26-27 (summarizing the V-HeFt
studies). The use of ACE inhibitors to prevent heart failure is a recent development, even
though they have been used to control blood pressure for over twenty years. Duenwald,
supra note 27, at F1.
74. E.g., Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036; Kahn, supra note 64, at 481; Jonathan Kahn,
Misreading Race and Genomics After BiDil, 37 NATURE GENETICS 655 (2005); Saul, supra
note 1, at C2.
75. Off-label use of a drug is a use that was not explicitly approved by the FDA. Thus,
a drug that was tested only on African-American adults and approved by the FDA only for
use by this population could be prescribed for Whites or children. See Dale E.
Hammerschmidt, Understanding the FDA’s IND Process, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 324 (Robert Amdur & Elizabeth Bankert eds.,
2002).
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C. A Growing Interest in “Race-Based” Medicine: Why Now?
As will be discussed below, scientists are developing an understanding
that “race” is not a genetic feature.76 At the same time, however, there is
also renewed and increasing interest in “racially-tailored” medicine.77 One
must wonder why this is so.
One response is that this approach holds true promise for patients, whose
treatment will thereby be considerably improved.78 Skeptics might point
out, however, that there are also academic, commercial, and regulatory
incentives to pursue “racial-profiling” in medicine.
The mapping of the human genome was achieved in 2003 as a result of
the Human Genome Project.79 The question now is how will the
knowledge gained be applied to improve human health? There is much
hope that it will ultimately lead to individualized genomic medicine,
whereby physicians can test individual genetic samples to determine what
treatment is best for each person.80 This advance, however, is years if not
decades away from becoming practical and widely accessible.81 In the
interim, developing a few different “race-based” treatment protocols that
are justified by apparent “racial” disparities in treatment response rates
might seem like a reasonable step in the right direction.82 Critics, however,
would argue that “race” is a crude and inaccurate marker and that its use

76. See infra Part II.A (indicating that genetic variations between all human beings
remain nominal); see also INST. OF MED., THE UNEQUAL BURDEN OF CANCER: AN
ASSESSMENT OF NIH RESEARCH AND PROGRAMS FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE
MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED 38 (M. Alfred Haynes & Brian D. Smedley eds., 1999) (stating
that “race” is not a biological reality, but rather is a “social or cultural construct of human
variability based on perceived differences in biology, physical appearance, and behavior”).
77. See Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 97 (recognizing that the movement toward
“race-based” medicine may, in fact, aggravate health disparities).
78. See Satel, supra note 6, at 58 (arguing that “race” may play a vital role in the
diagnosis and treating of certain diseases); Armand Marie Leroi, A Family Tree in Every
Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at A21 (asserting that “the recognition of race may
improve medical care”).
79. See Nicholas Wade, Once Again, Scientists Say Human Genome Is Complete, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at F1 (reporting on the status of the Human Genome Project).
80. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036 (discussing the possibility of finding genetic
variations and linking those variations to different therapeutic approaches); David Neil &
Jillian Craigie, The Ethics of Pharmacogenomics, 23 MONASH BIOETHICS REV. 9, 14 (2004)
(describing the “multi-drug resistance gene,” MDR1, “which is found in seventy percent of
Kenyans, thirty-two percent of Chinese, twenty-four percent of UK Caucasians and fifteen
percent of Southwest Asians”).
81. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 28 (estimating that “individualized genomic medicine is
decades away . . .”); Shields, supra note 15, at 80 (observing that “individualized medicine
is still in the future . . .”); Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 98 (cautioning that “the promise
of so-called ‘personalized’ genetic medicine is increasingly unlikely to be fulfilled in the
near-term future”).
82. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036 (articulating the position that “reliance on race is
merely an interim step on the path to personalized pharmacotherapy”); Kahn, supra note 7,
at 28 (explaining that resource and technological constraints impede the development of
individual genetic profiles).
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will lead to medical mistakes and potential exacerbation rather than
alleviation of health disparities.83
Pharmaceutical companies are also likely to be enthusiastic about
developing certain “racially-tailored” drugs.84 If a particular manufacturer
can produce a drug that is marketed as the medication of choice for all
Black, Asian, or Hispanic patients, it will be able to capture a significant
percentage of the market and divert it away from competitors who produce
the standard therapy.85 Moreover, drug companies engaging in research
and development that is specifically designed to improve treatment
outcomes for an underserved minority group might be able to obtain
financial and political support for their endeavors, which would not be
available for ordinary clinical studies.86 NitroMed, for example, obtained
the support of the Association of Black Cardiologists and the
Congressional Black Caucus, who were eager to have BiDil approved as a
drug for African-Americans suffering from heart failure.87
By extension, regulatory advantages might also motivate pharmaceutical
companies to pursue the development of “racially-tailored” medicine.88
Health disparities between Whites and Blacks in the United States have
been the subject of much commentary and debate in recent years and have
fueled a governmental interest in formulating an effective response.89 The
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) issued guidelines emphasizing the
importance of gathering data concerning treatment response differences
among various minority groups to achieve “change in health policy or
83. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036 (noting that the use of “race” could stigmatize
some ethnic groups); Neil & Craigie, supra note 80, at 14-15 (explaining the ethical
implications of research that uses “ethnicity as a recruitment shortcut”).
84. See Editorial, The First Race-Based Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 4, at 11
(illustrating the economic advantages of developing and marketing “racially-tailored”
prescription medicine).
85. Cf. Kahn, supra note 7, at 24-25 (observing that many companies currently seek to
develop “ethnic niche marketing”).
86. See id. at 23 (reporting that BiDil became “racialized” in part because of
commercial considerations); Bowser, supra note 10, at 1120 (stating that NitroMed raised
$31.4 million from private venture capital firms to support the A-HeFT study).
87. Kahn, supra note 7, at 23.
88. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 31 (positing that the regulatory system steered the
researchers of BiDil towards developing a “racially-tailored” drug to achieve FDA
approval).
89. See Rene Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An Institutional Analysis of
Medical Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79, 125-26 (2001) (noting that the past two
administrations have shown a desire to diminish health disparities); Ichiro Kawachi et al.,
Health Disparities By Race and Class: Why Both Matter, 24 HEALTH AFF. 343, 347-51
(2005) (arguing that society must address the injuries of both class and race in order to
reduce health disparities); David Satcher et al., What If We Were Equal? A Comparison of
The Black-White Mortality Gap in 1960 and 2000, 24 HEALTH AFF. 459, 462-63 (2005)
(observing that the elimination of significant health disparities between Black and White
Americans could prevent thousands of premature deaths per year); see also Mary Crossley,
Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195, 211-23
(2003) (positing that some physicians may have biases based on “race”).
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standard of care.”90 The NIH might thus be especially interested in funding
research projects with potential to improve the health status of a minority
group.91 The NIH guidelines also require the reporting of “racial” and
ethnic treatment response differences.92 The policy may thereby encourage
investigators to attribute differences to “race” and to respond to these
differences by developing “racially-tailored” therapies.93
Similarly, the FDA might be particularly willing to approve therapies
that are depicted as likely to reduce health disparities. In the case of BiDil,
the FDA declined approval of the drug as an alternative therapy for all
populations, but approved it for the use of African-Americans, despite
criticism on the part of some experts.94 It is also noteworthy that the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued a “race-based”
patent for BiDil even though an earlier patent already existed for the drug
as a non-”racially-tailored” medication.95 Consequently, scientists may
have incentives to conduct research that will prove the efficacy of a therapy
in a particular population in order to seek new “race-specific” patents for
existing products.96
This Article does not argue that attribute-based medicine should be
abandoned. Rather, it argues only that it is extremely important to identify
accurately the attributes that are relevant for the proposed medical protocol.
For this reason, the correct questions must be asked about the
characteristics that are responsible for distinguishable disease
vulnerabilities or treatment response rates. Is the difference based on a
specific genetic variation? Is it socio-economic status that causes
individuals to have poor nutrition, little opportunity for exercise, and
excessive stress? Or is it a combination of factors? The concept of “race”
is not helpful in this regard. Although it is likely to be more costly to
consider all of the relevant factors rather than to rely on the proxy of
90. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFF. OF EXTRAMURAL RES., NIH POLICY AND GUIDELINES
INCLUSION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH
[hereinafter NIH GUIDELINES] (Oct. 2001), http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/funding/
women_min/guidelines_amended_10_2001.htm.
91. See id. (contending that health disparities between Whites and Blacks should be
eliminated).
92. Id.
93. See infra Part IV.C.1 (analyzing the NIH policy).
94. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that after BiDil was rejected for use in the
general population, researchers began to analyze the effects of the drug on different “racial”
groups); Saul, supra note 1, at C2 (reporting the approval of BiDil as a “racially-tailored”
drug).
95. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 32 (noting that while the original patent will expire in
2007, the second patent will not expire until 2020); supra notes 25-37 and accompanying
text (emphasizing that Dr. Cohn focused on “race” in analyzing the V-HeFt data only after
he failed to obtain approval for a “race” neutral drug).
96. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036 (contending that commercial and regulatory
incentives have precipitated “racially-tailored” drug manufacturing).
ON THE
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“race,” comprehensive analysis is the only responsible way to proceed with
medical research and to achieve accurate research outcomes.
II. DOES “RACE” MEAN ANYTHING?
This Article argues against substantial use of the concept of “race” in
medical settings. A primary reason for this restriction is that “race” has no
coherent meaning, and therefore, reliance upon it for research or treatment
purposes can be confusing at best and can lead to significant adverse
consequences at worst.97 This section will build the argument that based on
medical science, the social sciences, and the law, “race” has no reliable
definition or real meaning. Moreover, it is a pernicious concept that has
been used to suggest that human beings can be divided into subspecies,
some of which are morally, intellectually, and physically inferior to others.
Thus, medical professionals should focus on more precise and meaningful
aspects of human identity rather than on the amorphous concept of “race.”98
A. “Race” in the Medical and Social Sciences
As early as 1937, Jacques Barzun wrote that “[a]mong the words that can
be all things to all men, the word “Race” has a fair claim to being the most
common, the most ambiguous, and the most explosive.”99 “Race” has been
defined as a biological feature;100 a local geographic population;101 a group
linked by common descent or origin;102 a population connected by a shared
history, nationality, or geographic distribution;103 a “subspecies”;104 and a
The word “race” has also been used
socio-political construct.105
interchangeably with “ethnicity,” “ancestry,” “culture,” “color,” “national

97. See infra Part III (discussing the dangers of “racial-profiling” in medicine).
98. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 1094 (maintaining that scientists should not rely on
the confused and incoherent idea of “race”).
99. JACQUES BARZUN, RACE: A STUDY IN MODERN SUPERSTITION 3 (1937).
100. See JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY: GENES, RACE, AND HISTORY 108
(1995) (explaining that “race” was seen as a dominant feature of human biology).
101. See DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING “RACE” AND “ETHNICITY” IN AMERICA 47
(2003) (defining “race” as a “local geographic or global human population distinguished as
a more or less distinct group by genetically transmitted physical characteristics” (citing
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1488 (1992))).
102. See id. (defining “race” as a group “connected by common descent or origin” (citing
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69 (1991))).
103. See id. (explaining that a group linked by national origin or geography constitutes a
“race” (citing WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY 968 (1984))).
104. See Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Meanings of “Race” in the New Genomics:
Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 33, 39
(2001).
105. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 17, 31 (1999); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of What?,
in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 237-38 (Robert Post & Michael Paul
Rogin eds., 1998).
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origin,” and even “religion.”106
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scientists attempted to
classify “racial” groups through assessment of physiological
characteristics.107 Samuel Morton, a prominent Philadelphia physician,
collected over 800 skulls from around the world.108 From these, he
attempted to calculate the skull capacities of different “races,” not
surprisingly finding that Caucasians ranked highest, Native Americans
ranked lower, and Blacks placed last.109 Morton’s results have been
discredited by contemporary scholars, such as Stephen J. Gould, who have
pointed out, for example, that skull size correlates with body size and that
body size does not necessarily correlate with intelligence level.110
The Nazis focused on the science of “race” with renewed intensity. In

106. See, e.g., Soo-Jin Lee, supra note 104, at 54 (noting that the terms used in
association with “race” vary widely and remain ambiguous); Fukurai, supra note 105, at 31
(noting that the use of “race” differs from country to country); ALAIN F. CORCOS, THE MYTH
OF HUMAN RACES 10-11 (1997) (asserting that there is no basis for the concept of “race” in
science since all humans are of one species); see also Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F.
Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (declaring that “the notion of ‘race’ as contrasted with
national origin is highly dubious”); Donald E. Muir, Race: The Mythic Root of Racism, in
THE CONCEPT OF “RACE” IN NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 96 (E. Nathaniel Gates ed.,
1997) (contending that “[b]ecause of sexual selection, individuals sharing national origin
(for example, Japanese), culture (for example, Gypsies), or religion (for example, Jews) also
tend to share physical traits and thus may have come to be considered a race.”); Thuy N.
Bui, The Difference Between Race and Color: Implications for Changing the Racial
Discourse, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 631, 638 (1998) (discussing “race” as a notion of
culture and color consciousness); Atwood D. Gaines, Race and Racism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 2191, 2193-94 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995) (positing that the use of
religion as a criterion for “race” is erroneous). One study conducted in the United States
involving lay-person focus groups concluded that African-Americans are more likely to
have a broad and malleable understanding of “race,” which includes notions of selfidentification and culture. See Tasha N. Dubriwny et al., Lay Understandings of Race:
Cultural and Genetic Definitions, 7 COMMUNITY GENETICS 185, 194 (2004). The study
involved 120 participants, including seven focus groups consisting of self-identified Blacks,
seven groups of self-identified Whites, and one group of self-identified Hispanics. Id. at
186. The participants were recruited from urban, suburban, and rural areas in Georgia. Id.
By contrast, European-Americans were more likely to understand “race” in terms of
physical characteristics, genetics, and geography. Id. at 185, 194.
107. See generally Hoffman, supra note 20, at 1113-16 (stating that many early
researchers looked to physiological differences to demonstrate the inferiority of Blacks and
the superiority of Whites).
108. WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 18 (1994).
109. See id. (citing SAMUEL MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA (1839)). Morton attempted to
develop a scientific method for his study. Id. He filled the skull cavity with white pepper
seeds that he then transferred to a tin cylinder from which he read the volume of seeds in
cubic inches. Id. He also repeated the experiment with lead shot. Id.; Samuel Morton,
Observations on the Size of the Brain in Various Races and Families of Man, 4
PROCEEDINGS ACAD. NAT. SCI. PHILA. 221-24 (1848).
110. TUCKER, supra note 108, at 19-20. Stephen J. Gould reanalyzed Morton’s original
measurements and found many serious errors, miscalculations, and omissions. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT
THE MILLENNIUM 46-47 (2001) (finding that Morton made a critical error in not
distinguishing samples by sex or physique); Stephen J. Gould, Morton’s Ranking of Races
by Cranial Capacity, 200 SCI. 503, 503-09 (1978) (discussing flaws in Morton’s work).
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order to identify Jews and Gypsies, who were targeted for extermination,
they scrutinized hair and eye color, the shape of nostrils, the skull, jaws,
earlobes, posture, the position of feet at rest, and even gait.111 Visitors to
contemporary Holocaust museums can often see photographs of Nazi
doctors measuring various features on people suspected of being Jews or
Gypsies.
Of particular interest in the early twenty-first century, following the
completion of the Human Genome Project’s mapping of the human
genome,112 is the question of whether “race” is a genetically valid concept.
Scientists estimate that human beings share 98.56% of their genes with
chimpanzees.113 Human beings have approximately 30,000 to 35,000
genes,114 and 99.9% of genes are identical in all individuals.115 While there
is variation in the remaining one tenth of a percent, ninety to ninety-five
percent of variations, called alleles,116 are found at equal rates in every
“racial” population.117 Consequently, only five to ten percent of all genetic
variations (in the one-tenth of a percent of genes that actually vary) are
distributed along geographical or continental lines.118 This can be
explained by the fact that human beings had to adapt to very different
climates in different regions, and certain features, such as light or dark skin,
are advantageous for particular environmental conditions.119
111. Judy Scales-Trent, Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany: The
Targeting Process, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 259, 279 (2001).
112. The Human Genome Project is an international research effort devised to analyze
the structure of DNA in human beings and other living creatures. See Mark Rothstein &
Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine, and Managed Care, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 849, 849 (1999).
113. J.W. Jamieson, The Reality of Race: Contra Biondi and Rickards, 42 MANKIND Q.
389, 399 (2002).
114. Alan Guttmacher & Francis Collins, Genomic Medicine, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1512, 1514 (2002).
115. David Rotman, Genes, Medicine, and the New Race Debate, TECH. REV., June
2003, at 41, 42.
116. An allele is an “alternative form of a gene.” Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 114,
at 1513.
117. Richard S. Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1166, 1167
(2003); Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298 SCI. 2381,
2381 (2002).
118. See Michael J. Bamshad, Human Population Genetic Structure and Inference of
Group Membership, 72 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 578, 578 (2003); Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P.
Wooding, Genetic Variation, Classification and ‘Race’, 36 NATURE GENETICS (SUPP.) S28,
S29 (2004) (stating that “ninety percent of total genetic variation would be found in a
collection of individuals from a single continent, and only ten percent more variation would
be found if the collection consisted of Europeans, Asians and Africans”).
119. See Kelly Owens & Mary-Claire King, Genomic Views of Human History, 286 SCI.
451, 453 (1999) (explaining that differences in skin and hair color, hair texture, and facial
features may be attributable to “differential selection by climate in various parts of the
world”); Vivian Wang & Stanley Sue, In the Eye of the Storm, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 37, 39
(2005) (“People from local population groups are typically more closely related than are
members of groups who live greater distances apart.”); see also Ossorio & Duster, supra
note 69, at 116 (stating that human “physical traits vary gradually, with groups that are close
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Recently, researchers have been able to classify individuals into clusters
based on similarities in particular sections of their genetic codes, and these
classifications correspond statistically to the “races” by which those tested
identified themselves.120 One study, led by Neil Risch, involved 3,636
subjects who identified themselves as White, African-American, East
Asian, and Hispanic.121 Researchers analyzed three hundred twenty-six
microsatellite markers in their DNA samples and found that the analysis
produced four major clusters that overwhelmingly corresponded to the
subjects’ self-identified “race.”122 Such statistics, however, can be
achieved only if the study includes participants whose recent ancestors all
come from one distinct geographic area.123 Furthermore, the clustering can
only be achieved through examination of microsatellites, which constitute a
particular “class of non-functional DNA” that are “not typical of genes” but
are selected because they are “‘maximally informative’ about group
differences.”124
Significantly, among the five to ten percent of variants in the tenth of a
geographic neighbors being more similar than groups that are geographically separated”);
Michael J. Bamshad, Genetic Influences on Health: Does Race Matter?, 294 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 937, 940 (2005) (concluding that “[r]ace reflects the varied geographic ancestry of
modern humans who have been partially isolated from one another throughout part of their
evolutionary history”).
120. See Hua Tang et al., Genetic Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and
Confounding in Case-Control Association Studies, 76 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 268, 271
(2005).
121. Id. at 269-70.
122. See id. at 268, 273-74 (remarking that only five subjects (0.14%) had genetic
clustering indicative of a “racial” identity that differed from the one they had listed).
123. See id. at 273-74 (acknowledging that the study underrepresented individuals who
had recent mixed ancestry, that clustering success depends on a group’s homogeneity
relative to the distance between groups, and that the study’s Hispanic population was
recruited from one location in Texas and consisted only of Mexican-Americans); Vence L.
Bonham et al., Race and Ethnicity in the Genome Era, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 9, 12 (2005)
(noting that a significant percentage of individuals do not have ancestry from only one
geographic region); see also Duster, supra note 55, at 1050 (critiquing studies of human
genetic diversity); Joseph L. Graves, What We Know and What We Don’t Know: Human
Genetic Variation and the Social Construction of Race, IS RACE “REAL”?, Apr. 25, 2005,
http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Graves/. Graves’ article, posted on a web forum entitled Is
Race “Real”? that was organized by the Social Science Research Council, explains that
To accurately represent the genetic diversity of the world’s people would require a
systematic collection along geographic distance between world regions. In
addition, within each region, suitable numbers of individuals would have to be
examined, particularly to discover genetic variants that are present in low
frequency. For example, studies by American drug companies often recruit people
with ancestry from three regions, African-Americans (representing sub-Saharan
Africa), European-Americans (representing various parts of Europe), and various
Asian-American groups. Sampling in this way ensures that individuals from these
specific regions will cluster into three groups, simply because individuals from
other portions of the spectrum of human genetic variation have been excluded from
the study.
Id.
124. Richard C. Lewontin, Confusions About Human Races, IS RACE “REAL”?, Apr. 20,
2005, http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Lewontin/.
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percent of variable genes that seem to be distributed differentially between
geographical populations, there are no variants that are found in all
members of one population group and not in any members of a different
population group.125 In addition, commentators emphasize that intra-group
genetic variation is dramatically greater than inter-group variation.126 For
instance, Black people originating in Africa demonstrate more genetic
variation than do people with recent ancestry from any other continent, so
that two Black individuals are likely to be more dissimilar genetically than
two members of any other “race.”127
Moreover, variation in genetic makeup and physical features is gradual
and continuous, so it is impossible to demarcate where one “race” ends and
another begins.128 For example, skin color, produced by a pigment called
melanin,129 slowly changes from one region to another so that people
whose geographic distance from one another is small tend to look more
alike than those living far apart.130 Also, individuals who share skin color
may have radically different ancestries, as is the case for sub-Saharan
Africans, New Guinea highlanders, and Australian aborigines, so that skin
color, as a proxy for “race,” is an extremely unreliable indicator.131
Like medical scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have long
debated the significance of “race.”132 The American Anthropological
125. Leda Cosmides et al., Perceptions of Race, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 173, 173
(2003); Bonham et al., supra note 123, at 12.
126. Alan H. Goodman, Why Genes Don’t Count (for Racial Differences in Health), 90
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1699, 1700 (2000); Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Race,
Ethnicity, and Genomics: Social Classifications as Proxies of Biological Heterogeneity, 12
GENOME RES. 844, 848 (2002), available at http://www.genome.org/cgi/reprint/12/
6/844; see Marcus W. Feldman et al., A Genetic Melting-Pot, 424 NATURE 374, 374 (2003)
(stating that “most genetic diversity occurs within groups, and that very little is found
between them”).
127. Ossorio & Duster, supra note 69, at 118.
128. See Goodman, supra note 126, at 1700; Seymour Garte, The Racial Genetics
Paradox in Biomedical Research and Public Health, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 421, 421
(2002) (“On a genetic level, human variation is a smooth continuum with very little
evidence for sharp racially defined heterogeneities.”); Wang & Sue, supra note 119, at 39
(“[P]hysical anthropologists and geneticists agree that traits (e.g., skin color) do not cluster
in rigidly bounded populations but gradually change in frequency from one geographic
region to another.”).
129. Richard A. Sturm et al., Human Pigmentation Genetics: The Difference Is Only
Skin Deep, 20 BIOESSAYS 712, 712 (1998); see also THE BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY
262 (1990).
130. Goodman, supra note 126, at 1700; see also Bamshad, supra note 118, at 587
(acknowledging that “[o]ur analysis is based on samples from regions of Africa, Asia, and
Europe that are widely separated from one another. Accordingly, these samples also
maximize the degree of genetic variation among populations.”).
131. See Bamshad, supra note 118, at 587.
132. See, e.g., Matt Cartmill, The Status of the Race Concept in Physical Anthropology,
100 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 651, 652 (1999) (detailing the arguments of proponents and
opponents of the “race” concept); Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is
Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is Real, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 16, 16-17 (2005) (reviewing
the historical and anthropological origins of the concept of “race” and arguing for the
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Association (“AAA”) issued a 1997 statement urging the federal
government to discontinue its use of the term “race” in the gathering of
data, because “‘race’ has been scientifically proven to not be a real, natural
phenomenon.”133 The AAA more emphatically articulated this position
when, in 1998, it wrote that “[t]he ‘racial’ worldview was invented to
assign some groups to perpetual low status, while others were permitted
access to privilege, power, and wealth.”134
In 2003, the American Sociological Association (“ASA”) issued its own
statement on “race.”135 The ASA noted that “race” has a significant impact
on individuals’ educational opportunities, employment, health status, place
of residence and treatment within the social justice system.136
Consequently, the organization urged the continued pursuit of scholarship
concerning “race,” asserting that “[r]efusing to acknowledge the fact of
racial classification, feelings, and actions, and refusing to measure their
consequences will not eliminate racial inequalities. At best, it will preserve
the status quo.”137 The ASA, however, did not address the biological
validity of “race” or attempt to define the concept’s meaning.138
B. “Race” and the Law
During the eras of slavery and segregation, state legislatures struggled to
create bright line rules in order to categorize people as White and Black.139
Different states developed the one-quarter rule, the one-eighth rule, the
one-sixteenth rule, the one-thirty-second rule, and the infamous one drop
rule.140 Thus, a person could be considered White in one state and Black in
another.141
continued assessment of “racial” and ethnic inequality).
133. AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N, RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15: RACE AND
ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (Sept. 1997)
[hereinafter AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15], http://www.aaanet.org/gv
t/ombdraft.htm.
134. AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N, STATEMENT ON “RACE” (1998), http://www.aaan
et.org/stmts/racepp.htm.
135. AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING DATA AND DOING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH ON RACE 1 (2003), http://www.asanet.org/galleries/defaultfile/asa_race_st
atement.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 3.
139. See PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950) (detailing the laws
of all the states, including their definitions of “Negro”).
140. See Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, Comment, “What Are You?”: Hapa-Girl and
Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 463, 473-74 (2000) (examining the development
of the “one-drop” rule which defined the Black “race” to include all those with any form of
African ancestry); State v. Treadaway, 52 So. 500, 502-10 (La. 1910) (noting that statutory
definitions of the word “Negro” varied from state to state).
141. See Luther Wright Jr., Note, Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares:
Reconceptualizing the United State’s Definintion of Race and Racial Classifications, 48
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The courts also struggled to define who was White and who was nonWhite for purposes of determining questions of status, rights, and
benefits.142 Predictably, the courts did not construct any systematic
methodology for making these determinations.143 A published study of
sixty-eight nineteenth-century cases that were appealed to southern state
supreme courts showed that “race” was often determined as much by the
way an individual “performed Whiteness” as by the individual’s
appearance, “blood,” or other presumably scientific evidence.144 Thus,
courts called for “reputation evidence,” judging men by their exercise of
good citizenship, gentleman-like behavior, and fulfillment of obligations in
the public sphere and judging women by their apparent “purity and moral
virtue.”145
The census provides a dramatic example of the fluidity of “racial”
categories. The choices listed in answer to the questions about the
respondent’s “race” have changed from decade to decade since 1870.146 In
1870 the list included only “white,” “colored,” “Chinese,” and “Indian.”147
In 2000, respondents could choose from the following “racial” categories:
“White,” “Black, African Am., or Negro,” “Asian Indian,” “Chinese,”
“Filipino,” “Japanese,” “Korean,” Vietnamese,” “Native Hawaiian,”
“Guamanian or Chamorro,” “Samoan,” “Other Pacific Islander,” “Other
Asian,” and “Some other race.”148 It is noteworthy that many of these
categories are not “races” in the traditional sense, but rather, refer to
VAND. L. REV. 513, 524 (explaining that an individual with a Black great-grandparent would
have been considered Black in states such as South Carolina or Florida, but the same
individual would have been considered White in a state such as Indiana, which had a
different statutory definition of “race”).
142. See Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 143 (1806) (holding that slaves
of Native-American descent were entitled to freedom).
143. See Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race” in
Twentieth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44, 51 (1996) (asserting that “the criteria used
to determine who fit in which category were more notable for their malleability than for
their logical consistency”).
144. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 120, 182-85 (1998) (examining cases
involving criminal prosecutions, inheritance disputes, slaves suing for their freedom, slander
claims, and slaveholders suing those who allegedly assisted runaway slaves passing as
White). In each case the “racial” identity of a person was disputed, and a determination of
whether the person was White or Black was relevant to the outcome of the litigation. Id. at
120-21.
145. Id. at 147-48, 157.
146. MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY (1988); see THE
POLITICS OF NUMBERS 229-32 (William Alonso & Paul Starr eds., 1986).
147. YANOW, supra note 101, at 56.
148. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000, 1 (2001) [hereinafter U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS], available at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d
02p.pdf. Ninety-seven percent of those who marked “some other race” indicated that they
were Hispanic. Elizabeth M. Greico & Rachel C. Cassidy, Overview of Race and Hispanic
Origin: Census 2000 Brief 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf, at 11.
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national origin (e.g. Korean, Japanese) or state/territory of origin (e.g.
Native Hawaiian, Guamanian). “Hispanic” is not considered a “race” for
purposes of the census,149 but rather an “ethnicity”150 and is addressed in a
separate question concerning Hispanic identity.151
The categorization of people of mixed “race” has also constituted a
conundrum for the Census Bureau. Until 1980, “multi-racial” individuals
were required to identify themselves by the “race” of their non-White
parent.152 In 1990, those who wrote “Black-White” in response to the
inquiry about “race” were identified as Black, and those who wrote
“White-Black” were classified as White.153 The 2000 census finally
included the option of self-identification by more than one “race.”154
Almost seven million Americans chose two or more “races” by which to
describe themselves.155 According to the Census Bureau, however,
seventy-five percent of those who now identify themselves as Black could
also correctly claim multiracial origins.156 In addition, according to
149. Id. at 1 (“The Federal Government considers race and Hispanic origin to be two
separate and distinct concepts.”).
150. The concept of “ethnicity,” which is often substituted for “race,” also has no fixed
meaning and would not be a significant improvement over “race.” To illustrate, one source
quotes the following definitions of “ethnicity,” found in a variety of dictionaries:
Of or pertaining to a social group . . . on the basis of complex, often variable traits
including religious, linguistic, ancestral, or physical characteristics. (American
Heritage Dictionary 1975, p. 450)
1a. Of or pertaining to sizable groups of people sharing a common and distinctive
racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage. (American Heritage
Dictionary 1992, p. 630)
Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological. (Oxford English
Dictionary 1971, p. 313)
2a. Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological. Also, pertaining
to or having common racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics. . .;
hence (U.S. colloq), foreign, exotic. (Oxford English Dictionary 1991, p. 423) Of
or relating to a religious, racial, national or cultural group. (Webster’s II New
Riverside University 1984, p. 445).
YANOW, supra note 101, at 47.
151. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS, supra note 148, at 3.
152. Scales-Trent, supra note 111, at 285.
153. Id.
154. YANOW, supra note 101, at 72.
155. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE, supra note 12. More specifically, the responses
were as follows: two or more “races”—6,826,228; two “races”—6,368,075; White: Black
or African American—784,764; White: American Indian and Alaska Native—1,082,683;
White: Asian—868,395; White: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander—112,964;
White: Some other “race”—2,206,251; Black or African American: American Indian and
Alaska Native—182,494; Black or African American: Asian—106,782; Black or African
American: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander—7,328; American Indian and
Alaska Native: Some other “race”—93,842; Asian: Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific
Islander—138,802; Asian: Some other “race”—249,108; Native Hawaiian and other
Pacific Islander: Some other “race”—35,108; Three or more “races”—458,153. Id.; see
also Elizabeth M. Greico & Rachel C. Cassidy, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin:
Census 2000 Brief 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr011.pdf (discussing census data concerning Hispanics).
156. Bowser, supra note 10, at 1113-14.
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scientists, on average, African-Americans have an admixture of ten to
twenty percent white genetic ancestry, based on familial lineage.157
C. Shifting the Focus Away from “Race”
When scrutinized carefully and studied through the lens of a number of
disciplines, the concept of “race” has no coherent meaning. Moreover, it is
a pernicious concept that suggests that human beings can be divided into
subspecies, some of which are morally, intellectually, and physically
superior to others.158 This misconception has led to the oppression,
subjugation, and even extermination of millions of people, as evidenced by
genocides such as the Nazi Holocaust and the slaughter in Rwanda.159
Even in contemporary intellectual circles, some are promoting theories
concerning the inferiority of the Black “race.”160 For example, in 1994,
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray published a book called The Bell
Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life,161 which
focused on the fact that on average, African-Americans score fifteen or
sixteen points lower than Whites on Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) tests.162
Instead of critiquing the validity of IQ tests or the environmental factors
that might contribute to the scoring disparities,163 the authors concluded
157. See Esteban J. Parra et al., Estimating African-American Admixture Proportions by
Use of Population-Specific Alleles, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1839, 1839 (1998) (finding
that European genetic ancestry in ten U.S. populations of African descent ranged from 6.8%
in Jamaicans to 22.5% in those from New Orleans).
158. See Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Review Essay: Navigating the Topology of Race, 46
STAN. L. REV. 747, 759 (noting that physical traits are often associated with moral
characteristics); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual
Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1461 (2002) (discussing the
theory that “race consciousness breeds a culture of inferiority, victimization, and
helplessness among persons of color”); Ossorio & Duster, supra note 69, at 119 (stating that
“people often interact with each other on the basis of their beliefs that race reflects physical,
intellectual, moral, or spiritual superiority or inferiority”).
159. See AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15, supra note 133 (referring to “the
Holocaust, slavery, and the extirpation of American Indian populations” as examples of the
“ultimate use of categorical notions of race [which] have occurred to achieve political
ends . . .”).
160. See Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 98 (stating that “even today, beliefs in genetic
variation among different ‘races’ are routinely used by racists as evidence in favor of
discriminatory programs or against programs that ameliorate historical and structurally
based discrimination”).
161. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 118-20 (The Free Press 1994).
162. Id. at 276.
163. See THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 45 (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (criticizing Herrnstein and Murray for engaging in distortion of
data and political advocacy rather than objective, scientific analysis); Robert J. Sternberg et
al., Intelligence, Race, and Genetics, 60 AM. PSYCH. 46, 52, 57 (2005) (explaining that
“[a]lthough attempts have been made to establish genes for intelligence . . . none have been
conclusively identified,” that intelligence is “ill defined,” and that “studies currently
indicating alleged genetic bases of racial differences in intelligence fail to make their
point . . .”); David C. Rowe, Under the Skin: On the Impartial Treatment of Genetic and
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that this population simply was less intelligent than others.164 Furthermore,
the authors asserted that the ranks of the destitute, the criminal, the
unemployed, those bearing children out of wedlock, and the socially
maladjusted are populated by the unintelligent, and consequently, by a
disproportionate number of African-Americans.165
A second book, written by Michael Levin, Why Race Matters, went a
step further, arguing that African-Americans are not only typically less
intelligent than Whites, but also are more aggressive, assertive, and
impulsive than Caucasians.166 Furthermore, according to the author, Blacks
have a different moral orientation from Whites, are more likely to commit
crimes, suffer from “an absence of conscience” and self-monitoring, and
have less free will than Whites.167
It should be emphasized that I do not argue that individuals should stop
thinking of themselves as African-American, White, Hispanic, Jewish, et
cetera. These identities are central and empowering for many people, and I
am not arguing that they should be expunged. However, deeming them to
be “race” designations is not useful. More accurately, these relate to
people’s continent of origin, color, national origin, religion, and culture.
Moreover, because “race” is an incoherent term that eludes clear
definition and because its use reinforces misconceptions about biological
differences among human populations, it should not be the focus of
medical inquiry.168 Rather, in designing research and providing care, health
professionals interested in a patient’s background should consider a
combination of factors, among which might be an individual’s ancestry,
socio-economic status, genetic make-up, health habits, cultural beliefs, and
others. Generally, however, no single aspect of a person’s identity should
be the sole basis for research or therapeutic decisions.169
The term “race” obfuscates social discourse, policy-making, and medical
Environmental Hypotheses of Racial Differences, 60 AM. PSYCH. 60, 60 (2005) (advocating
the examination of both genetic and environmental hypotheses in studying differences in
intelligence).
164. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 161, at 269.
165. Id. at 25-27, 63-64.
166. MICHAEL LEVIN, WHY RACE MATTERS: RACE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT THEY MEAN
213 (Praeger 1997).
167. Id. at 213, 322; see also J. Philippe Rushton, Construct Validity, Censorship, and
The Genetics of Race, 50 AM. PSYCH. 40, 41 (1995) (defending the concepts of “race” and
“race” differences based on what the author finds to be reliable evidence of differences in
“brain size, IQ, violent crime, testosterone, sexuality, and AIDS”).
168. See Charles Sullivan, Racial Distinctions in Medicine, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 249, 254 (2002) (arguing that in pursuing this medical inquiry, society runs the risk of
breathing new life into the type of scientific racism prevalent at the turn of the twentieth
century).
169. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (contending that the unreliable
concept of “race” should not serve as a method of categorizing individuals for purposes of
medical treatment).
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decision-making because it subsumes so many different meanings. In the
following section this Article will analyze the specific hazards of “raciallytailored” research and therapeutic practices.
III. THE DANGERS OF “RACIAL PROFILING” IN MEDICINE
A. Medical Mistakes
Reliance on the concept of “race” can lead to unfortunate medical
mistakes, which in turn, can generate medical malpractice claims.170 The
problem is obvious in the diagnostic setting. If sickle cell anemia is
thought of only as a “racial” disease that affects African-Americans,
doctors will miss diagnoses in people with ancestry from Greece, Italy, and
the Arabian Peninsula, who are also vulnerable to the illness.171 If cystic
fibrosis is perceived as a disease that affects only people of Northern
European descent, it will be under-diagnosed in Black patients.172
Similarly, a recent study examined counseling concerning testing for
BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are largely associated with Ashkenazi Jewish
women.173 It found that African-American women with a first or second
degree relative who had suffered breast or ovarian cancer were far less
likely to get counseling concerning testing for the genetic abnormality than
White women, even though their risk of having BRCA1/2 was no
smaller.174
170. See MARCIA M. BOUMIL & DAVID J. SHARPE, LIABILITY IN MEDICINE AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 43 (2004) (explaining that in an ordinary medical malpractice case the plaintiff will
allege that the health care provider was negligent in that she failed to use due care under the
circumstances, thereby injuring the patient); Crossley, supra note 89, at 244 (explaining that
malpractice suits are often based on allegations that the physician “failed to conform to the
standard of care” required for “treating patients with the plaintiff’s condition”).
171. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 38.
172. See Richard S. Garcia, The Misuse of Race in Medical Diagnosis, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., May 9, 2003, at B15 (relating the story of an African-American girl whose cystic
fibrosis was not diagnosed until she reached the age of eight because the disease is much
more common among Whites than among Blacks and thus her doctors overlooked its
possibility in her case).
173. See Katrina Armstrong et al., Racial Difference in the Use of BRCA1/2 Testing
Among Women With a Family History of Breast or Ovarian Cancer, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1729, 1734 (2005) (“Women with a first- or second-degree relative with breast or ovarian
cancer, the predicted probability of a BRCA 1/2 mutation differed very little between
African-American and White women.”); see also Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The
Genetic “Quick Fix,” and The Jewish Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 98 (1997)
(estimating that roughly one percent of Eastern European Jews are predisposed to ovarian
and breast cancer due to a specific gene mutation); Jacqueline Stevens, Racial Meanings and
Scientific Methods: Changing Policies for NIH-Sponsored Publications Reporting Human
Variation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1033, 1044 (2003) (providing background
information concerning BRCA 1 and 2 testing).
174. Armstrong, supra note 173, at 1729; see Rita Nanda et al., Genetic Testing in an
Ethnically Diverse Cohort of High-Risk Women, 294 JAMA 1925, 1925 (2005) (finding that
“[i]rrespective of ancestry, early age at diagnosis and a family history of breast and ovarian
cancer are the most powerful predictors of mutation status and should be used to guide
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The same concern applies to the treatment setting. Under the currently
approved FDA label, individuals who appear to be non-Black might not be
prescribed BiDil, even though they could benefit from it.175 On the other
hand, physicians might automatically prescribe BiDil to all individuals who
appear to be African-Americans, even though it might not be appropriate
for some members of this population group. Therapies that are developed
in the future could similarly be tested on only a limited population group
and, therefore, be approved in a manner that is over-inclusive or underinclusive or both.
Because genetic variations are shared by multiple populations, “race” is
a crude and unreliable predictor of how an individual will respond to a
particular therapy if genetic factors are involved.176 To illustrate the
complicated nature of “race-based” genetic susceptibility, one can turn to a
recent report of the discovery of a genetic variation that is associated with a
risk of heart attack.177 The allele is common among Americans of
European descent, but causes only a sixteen percent increase in risk within
this population.178 By contrast, it is found in only six percent of AfricanAmericans, but increases the risk of heart attack by over 250% for
American Blacks.179 Furthermore, disease vulnerabilities and treatment
responses are often explained by both genetic and environmental
influences, including poor diet, poverty, and excessive stress, which cross
population lines.180 Consequently, it is inappropriate to make facile
assumptions about medical treatment and prognosis based on “race.”
Even if “race” were somehow a relevant variable, it is often difficult to
accurately determine a person’s “race.” Health care providers often judge
“race” identity through personal observation or through the patient’s self-

clinical decision making” concerning BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing).
175. See Saul, supra note 1, at C2 (indicating that some in the medical community
believe BiDil could work for people of all “races,” not just Blacks).
176. See supra Part II.A; Jorde & Wooding, supra note 118, at S32.
177. Nicholas Wade, Genetic Find Stirs Debate on Race-Based Medicine, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2005, at A14.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Nancy Krieger, If “race” is the answer, what is the question?---on “race,”
racism,
and
health:
a
social
epidemiologist’s
perspective,
http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Kriege
r/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (stating that “[t]he evidence that health varies by
socioeconomic position within all US racial/ethnic groups . . . is substantial and
longstanding” (citing, among others, David R. Williams and Chiquita Collins, US
Socioeconomic and Racial Differences in Health: Patterns and Explanations, 21 ANN. REV.
SOCIOL. 349 (1995); G. Davey Smith, Learning to Live with Complexity: Ethnicity,
Socioeconomic Position, and Health in Britain and the United States, 90 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1694, 1697 (2000); Nancy Krieger et al., Painting a Truer Picture of US
Socioeconomic and Racial/Ethnic Health Inequalities: The Public Health Disparities
Geocoding Project, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 312, 314 (2005))).
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identification.181 Because of the growing mixed-origin phenomenon in the
Untied States, both of these methods can be very misleading. Individuals
who look White can have eighty percent West African origins according to
their genetic profiles, and those who look Black can have primarily
European ancestry.182 Therefore, those who look White or Black to a
physician may not be so genetically, and those who experience themselves
as African-American or Caucasian and self identify as such, may be
otherwise in genetic terms.
It follows that “racial profiling” is also alarming in the research
context.183 If researchers test a new drug combination only on members of
one “race,” the outcome will be flawed. First, if the subject population is
based on individual self-identification, the study’s results could be skewed
because many of the participants will actually be of mixed origins or
predominantly of ancestry other than that which they reported.184 Second,
if researchers test a treatment only on one population because of academic,
commercial, or regulatory pressures or in order to facilitate recruitment or
save costs and do not refine their research to determine exactly who will
benefit from the therapy regardless of “race,” they would not be serving the
general patient community as ably as possible.185
B. Stigmatization and Discrimination
Public perception that scientific evidence has established that a particular
“race” is more vulnerable to life-threatening illnesses than others or does
not respond to medications that cure most patients may reinforce negative
“race-based” stereotypes and misconceptions.186 Particular populations
may be seen as diseased or incurable. This could fuel the belief that there
are inferior human subspecies and biological differences among “races.”
To illustrate, when testing was first developed for the BRCA1/2 genetic
abnormalities, there was concern among some Jewish advocates that it

181. See Wang & Sue, supra note 119, at 43 (warning of the problems associated with
“race-based” medicine). Some physicians may feel uncomfortable asking patients about
their “racial” identity or might believe that their patient’s “race” is obvious and, therefore,
not ask patients to self-identify.
182. Ossorio & Duster, supra note 69, at 118 (citing Flavia C. Parra et al., Color and
genomic ancestory in Brazilians, FNAS, 177-82 (2003); M.D. Shriver et al., Skin
Pigmentation, Biogeographical Ancestry and Admixture Mapping, 112 HUMAN GENETICS
387-99 (2003)).
183. See Sharona Hoffman & Jessica W. Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing potential legal claims against Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs) that improperly approve research studies).
184. Bowser, supra note 10, at 1113-14.
185. See Bloche, supra note 39, at 2035-37 (discussing the BiDil trial); Neil & Craigie,
supra note 80, at 15; see also supra Part I.C (discussing the academic, commercial, and
regulatory incentives for the pursuit of “racially-tailored” research).
186. Neil & Craigie, supra note 80, at 15.
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would lead to stigmatization.187 Commentators expressed anxiety that Jews
would be generally considered to have defective or bad genes, and this
possibility raised the specter of the Holocaust and Nazi claims about Jewish
inferiority in some minds.188
Likewise, a study of lay people’s attitudes towards “racially varied
pharmacogenomics,”189 revealed a significant amount of suspicion
concerning “race-based prescription” and a preference for individualized
genetic testing to determine the best course of treatment.190 The practice of
basing treatment decisions on “race” was viewed as unwelcome “racial
profiling.”191
Stigmatization, in turn, can lead to discrimination in the workplace and
elsewhere.192 Some employers may seek to avoid hiring or promoting
members of certain “races” because of a fear that they are at high risk of
suffering from life-threatening diseases (e.g. cancer) or that they will be
untreatable with conventional medicine if they are stricken with serious
illnesses (e.g. heart disease). Employers will be concerned about excessive
absenteeism, low productivity, and high insurance costs due to aboveaverage medical expenses.193
More sophisticated employers may try to avoid biased assumptions and
actually test at-risk populations for the presence of genetic abnormalities
but may exclude individuals from employment opportunities based on a

187. See Gina Kolata, Genetic Testing Falls Short of Public Embrace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1998, at A16 (noting that patients have many concerns, including losing medical
insurance if they test positive for genetic mutations associated with cancer).
188. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Concern Among Jews Is Heightened As Scientists Deepen
Gene Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998, at A24; see Deborah J. Bowen et al., Jewish
Identity and Intentions to Obtain Breast Cancer Screening, 9 CULTURAL DIVERSITY &
ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 79, 85 (2003) (mentioning “fear of genetic stigmatization” as a
possible cause of a particular population group’s failure to receive genetic testing for
particular diseases); Lisa Soleymani Lehmann et al., A population-based study of Ashkenazi
Jewish women’s attitudes toward genetic discrimination and BRCA 1/2 testing, 4 GENETICS
IN MED. 346-48 (2003) (reporting that thirteen percent of Jewish women surveyed believed
“that BRCA 1/2 testing will lead to increased anti-Semitism”). There is no evidence that
these fears have become justified thus far.
189. Jennifer L. Bevan et al., Informed Lay Preferences For Delivery of Racially Varied
Pharmacogenomics, 5 GENETICS IN MED. 393 (2003).
190. See id. at 393, 398 (suggesting that minority groups may be especially suspicious of
genetic testing).
191. Id. at 398; see Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 100-01 (surveying studies regarding
various attitudes concerning “racial profiling” in medicine).
192. Kahn, supra note 7, at 41.
193. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on “race,”
color, national origin, sex, and religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Employers may,
however, consider it worthwhile to violate Title VII and risk civil litigation in which
plaintiffs bear a heavy burden of proof. See Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations
and Job-Relatedness: How to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the
Workplace, 49 KAN. L. REV. 517, 552-55 (2001) (discussing the reasons for employment
discrimination against individuals with actual or potential disabilities).
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In several documented cases,
misunderstanding of test results.194
employers singled out Black individuals for testing for the sickle cell trait,
that is, for carrying one copy of the sickle cell gene, even though carrier
status has absolutely no adverse health implications.195 From the early
1970s until 1981, the U.S. Air Force Academy excluded all Blacks with the
sickle cell trait, and commercial air carriers did the same until well into the
1980s.196
In the late 1990s, litigation was brought to challenge another employer’s
program of collecting blood samples from Black employees and testing
them for the sickle cell trait without disclosing that this was the intent of
the blood test.197 The Ninth Circuit held that such testing constituted an
invasion of privacy under the California and U.S. constitutions and a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in part because
African-Americans were treated differently from other employees.198
Furthermore, according to a workplace testing survey conducted in 2001 by
the American Management Association, 1.3% of employers acknowledged
testing employees for sickle cell anemia.199 The reported results did not
specify whether the employers tested for the presence of disease symptoms
or for the sickle cell trait and did not indicate whether only AfricanAmericans were tested, though that is presumably the case.
Likewise, health insurers selling individual insurance policies200 might
194. The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employment discrimination based on
an individual’s disability, record of a disability, or perceived disability. However, it does
not clearly apply to genetic vulnerability to disease. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12112(a)
(2000).
195. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 38 (noting that those who carry the genetic variation for
sickle cell anemia do not suffer from the illness, but if they have a child with another carrier,
the child could inherit a copy of the gene from each parent and thus acquire the ailment). In
fact, having just one copy of the gene for sickle cell anemia may actually have health
benefits since it is believed to increase the carrier’s resistance to malaria, a disease prevalent
in Africa. Id.
196. See id. at 39 (noting that the Academy ended this policy only in 1981, after a
lawsuit had been filed).
197. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1266-67 (9th
Cir. 1998). The employer, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, collected blood and urine
samples during a mandatory physical exam and tested them for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and
pregnancy. Id.
198. Id. at 1275.
199. AM. MGMT. ASS’N, 2001 AMA SURVEY ON WORKPLACE TESTING: MEDICAL
TESTING (2001), http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/mt_2001.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2005).
200. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 provides that
insurers offering group plans cannot deny enrollment or charge higher premiums to any
member of the group because of health status, medical history, or genetic information. 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg(b)(1)(B), and 300gg-1(b)(1) (2000). The law, however, does not
extend to protect those seeking individual insurance plans. Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual
Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing the Medical, Public Health, and Fundamental
Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 280 (2001). Such consumers might be subjected to
discrimination in the form of exorbitant premium charges or complete denial of coverage.
See id. Approximately ten to fifteen percent of insured individuals have individual policies.
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use a person’s “race” as a mechanism for risk assessment and price-setting
despite its unreliability.201 They may base decisions about issuing health
insurance policies or determining premium amounts on general
assumptions concerning the person’s “race” rather than on individualized
assessments.202 They could, for example, assume that Black customers are
generally at increased risk for high blood pressure or cannot be treated with
inexpensive, conventional therapies for common diseases and, therefore,
should be charged higher premiums or denied coverage altogether.203
C. Exacerbation of Health Disparities
It is theoretically possible that if the practice of medicine becomes
increasingly “racially-tailored,” minorities seeking care in largely White
communities will be advised to go to doctors in other areas, such as
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods in the inner city, who
purportedly have more expertise in treating people of their ancestry. Just as
we have experts today who focus on particular ailments, such as
oncologists and cardiologists, in the future we could have experts who
specialize in treating different “races.” Thus, medical care could become
more segregated, and disparities could grow rather than diminish as a result
of the new approach.
Other commentators hypothesize that an emphasis on differences among
“racial” groups may encourage health care givers to provide inferior
treatment to minorities, as some health care providers are already accused
of doing.204 If all patients with a particular illness cannot be treated the
same, and there is no single standard of care, some doctors might, at least
unconsciously, invest more effort and resources in serving White patients,
who can be given familiar, traditional treatments.205 “Race-based”
Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 112, at 869. But see infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing state
insurance laws that prohibit “race” discrimination).
201. See Neil & Craigie, supra note 80, at 15 (mentioning the possibility of
discrimination by insurers).
202. Id.
203. See infra Part V.B (discussing the difficulty of determining individual “racial”
identity).
204. See Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 98, 104 (warning that researchers and
practitioners in the medical profession are at risk of having individual levels of “racism
increased by the practice of race-based medicine” because individuals in the medical
profession “are the persons most likely to receive repeated exposure to such messages”).
205. See Kahn, supra note 7, at 6-7 (cautioning that BiDil and similar drugs may lead to
significant “racial” disparities in treatment, as opposed to the intended result of developing
innovative and beneficial therapies for underserved minorities). Many studies confirm that
even without any recommended treatment differences, African-Americans are routinely
under-treated for serious health conditions. See Viola Vaccarino et al., Sex and Racial
Differences in the Management of Acute Myocardial Infraction, 1994-2002, 353 NEW ENGL.
J. MED. 671, 671 (2005) (concluding that “[r]ates of reperfusion therapy, coronary
angiography, and in-hospital death after myocardial infraction, but not the use of aspirin and
beta-blockers, vary according to race and sex, with no evidence that the differences have
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medicine could also intensify the distrust that some African-Americans feel
towards the medical profession in the aftermath of the Tuskegee syphilis
trial and other scandals.206 African-Americans might absorb the message
that medical professionals view them as biologically distinct from other
groups and are looking for ways to exclude them from receiving
mainstream, standard therapies.
IV. VIOLATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
“Race-based” medicine may violate a variety of legal anti-discrimination
mandates, including the Constitution, federal laws, state statutes, federal
research regulations, and NIH guidelines. If health care professionals and
medical researchers rely upon the meaningless notion of “race” rather than
basing decisions on more accurate and sound classifications, they may run
afoul of the law in a number of ways that are analyzed below.
A. Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws
In a thorough and insightful article, Erik Lillquist and Charles Sullivan
analyze a number of federal anti-discrimination provisions that could be
violated by the practice of “race-based” medicine.207 Nevertheless, while
these laws create potential causes of action for individuals subjected to
“racial profiling” in medicine, they are not strong avenues for redress.
First, the Constitution’s Equal Protection provisions prohibit state and
federal governmental entities from denying individuals the “equal
protection of the laws.”208 This prohibition would apply to actions by
governmental agencies, public hospitals, and public research institutions.209
narrowed in recent years”); Ashish K. Jha, Racial Trends in the Use of Major Procedures
among the Elderly, 353 N. ENGL. J. MED. 683, 683 (2005) (finding that “[f]or the decade of
the 1990s, [there was] . . . no evidence, either nationally or locally, that efforts to eliminate
racial disparities in the use of high-cost surgical procedures were successful.”).
206. See Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 98 (underscoring that medical treatment in the
United States is characterized by a history of differential treatment that often leads to health
disparities such as “substantially greater mortality and morbidity in non-dominant racialized
groups”); see also Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, The
Institutional Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 729-31 (2001)
(describing the Tuskegee syphilis trial and other medical research abuses). The Tuskegee
syphilis trial began in 1932 and continued into the 1970s. Id. at 730. In the trial, Tuskegee
researchers studied African-American males suffering from untreated syphilis. Id. The
researchers did not give their subjects penicillin even after it became widely available and
was known to be an effective cure for the disease. Id.
207. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 442 (stating that “racial profiling” in
medicine could implicate the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
208. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1; see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 215-16 (1995) (explaining that while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the
states, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes an identical equal protection
mandate on the federal government).
209. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 443 (noting that Equal Protection claims
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The equal protection mandate might be invoked by individuals who feel
they are treated differently in a medical setting because of their “race.”
However, plaintiffs asserting equal protection claims against
governmental actors will face the hurdles of immunity. The Eleventh
Amendment provides that states cannot be sued in federal court for
constitutional violations.210 Eleventh Amendment immunity has been
interpreted to extend to cases asserting constitutional claims in state court
as well211 and covers agencies and other arms of the state.212 The
amendment bars all suits for damages or retroactive relief against state
governments that are sued by any party other than a different state or the
federal government.213 Likewise, the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity protects the United States from being sued without its consent.214
Thus, state or federal institutions, such as hospitals or clinics, could not be
sued by patients for constitutional violations.215
In addition, the defense of qualified immunity shields federal and state
government officials who are performing discretionary functions from
liability for civil damages, unless their conduct violates “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”216 Consequently, individual governmental actors can be held
are enforced through actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or as Bivens actions pursuant
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
210. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” See MARK R. BROWN & KIT
KINPORTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION UNDER § 1983 196 (LexisNexis 2003) (explaining
that Congress can abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity through legislation passed under
Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment, which enables Congress to enforce the
Amendment through appropriate legislation).
211. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment deprives Congress of the authority to subject non-consenting States to private
suits for damages in state courts).
212. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (holding that a suit against current
and former directors of a state’s department of public aid amounted to a suit against the
state); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945) (finding that a suit
against a state’s department of treasury and individuals on the treasury’s board constituted
an action against the state); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1056-57 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that
Supreme Court jurisprudence interprets statewide agencies as extensions of the state).
213. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 (holding that Congress cannot abrogate State sovereign
immunity under Article I of the Constitution); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (6th ed. 2000) (observing that even if the Eleventh Amendment
applies, a federal court may hear the suit if the state consents).
214. FALLON ET AL., supra note 212, at 1001.
215. Id. at 1057 (emphasizing that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to
local government entities in most cases); Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (concluding that local government bodies are liable for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in some instances).
216. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (addressing whether senior
presidential aides could assert a qualified immunity defense); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that “[w]hether an official may prevail in his qualified
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liable only if they could be expected to have known that their actions would
result in a violation of constitutional rights.217 Proving such knowledge is
difficult, though not impossible.218
A second federal law provision that may apply to “racially-tailored”
medicine, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, proscribes “race-based” discrimination with
respect to contracts involving either public or private parties.219 Section
1981, however, has rarely been successfully invoked in health care cases.220
Furthermore, Section 1981 plaintiffs must prove that the alleged wrong
occurred in association with a “contract,” a particularly challenging task in
the research context.221
Third, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 disallows “race”
discrimination on the part of federally funded programs, even if the funding
recipient is a private institution.222 Nevertheless, courts have held that Title
VI does not apply to doctors receiving Medicare payments because they are
not federally-funded “programs” as defined by the law,223 even though Title
VI covers hospitals and long-term care facilities receiving federal funds.224
immunity defense depends upon the ‘objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured
by reference to clearly established law.’“ (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
217. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 191 (emphasizing that an official’s subjective state of mind
is not relevant to the determination of a qualified immunity defense).
218. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (indicating that if the law is clearly established, an
immunity defense will usually fail because a reasonably competent government official is
presumed to know the law governing his conduct).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). The statute provides that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 189 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to private conduct).
220. See Daniels v. Murphy, 528 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D.Okla. 1978) (holding that plaintiffs
who filed a wrongful death action failed to state a claim under section 1981 because they did
not allege “racial” discrimination by any defendant); United States v. Med. Soc’y of S.C.,
298 F. Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969) (ruling that § 1981 protects African-American
patients’ rights to be admitted to hospitals); Sullivan, supra note 168, at 254-55 (conceding
that individuals rarely invoke § 1981, unless to challenge denials of medical staff privileges
based on discrimination).
221. Courts rarely find the presence of a contract between a researcher and the human
research subjects. See Roger L. Jansson, Note, Researcher Liability for Negligence in
Human Subject Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78
WASH. L. REV. 229, 242-43 (2003) (analyzing whether researchers have a special
relationship with human subjects). Only one court, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc.,
782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001), has found that an informed consent agreement may constitute a
contract between the researcher and subject. Id. at 243.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). The provision reads: “No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”
223. See Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Mem’l Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424, 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(denying relief under Title VI because the plaintiff improperly relied on Medicare/Medicaid
payments to defendant physician as the basis of plaintiff’s Title VI claim). The court
determined that the defendant was not the intended beneficiary of such programs, making
Title VI relief inappropriate. Id.; cf. Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 445 (noting that
these decisions severely restrict Title VI’s coverage in the medical context).
224. See United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 970 F.2d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1992)
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Finally, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964225 forbids discrimination
and segregation in places of public accommodation.226 However, the
provision defining “a place of public accommodation” refers specifically to
lodging, eating establishments, gasoline stations, and exhibition or
entertainment facilities,227 but not to medical facilities.228 Thus, it remains
unclear whether health care entities would constitute public
accommodations under the law.229
In short, federal law provides a number of potential causes of action for
those aggrieved by “racially-tailored” medicine, but each has its
shortcomings. Consequently, sources other than federal civil rights laws
may provide stronger protection for patients.
B. State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in the Medical Arena
Many state laws prohibit discrimination by health care providers, some
of which could apply to “race-based” medicine.230
1. Civil rights statutes
The majority of states have civil rights statutes that proscribe
discrimination based on “race” with respect to public accommodations.
Arizona has a typical statute:
(concluding that Title VI applies to physician staff privileges at hospitals receiving federal
funds); Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that Congress
intended Title VI to apply to federally funded health care programs).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
226. Id. § 2000a(a). The text reads as follows: “All persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”
227. Id. § 2000a(b).
228. Id.; see Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that
plaintiff lacked standing to assert a Title II claim against a hospital because even if he could
prove that he suffered covered discrimination, the statute awards only prospective injunctive
relief rather than damages, and he would not suffer continuing harm from the hospital’s
alleged discriminatory actions); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 CIV. 0300, 1989 WL 146265, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1989) (finding that Title II does not cover hospitals). But cf. United
States v. Med. Soc’y of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (D.S.C. 1969) (holding that Title II
covered a hospital, in part because the hospital had a cafeteria and snack bar that served
food to interstate travelers).
229. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 446 (noting that although case law in this
area is contradictory and sparse, if section 2000(a) applies, “it is probably limited to
disparate treatment discrimination”).
230. See OFF. OF MINORITY HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ASSESSMENT OF STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE COLLECTION AND REPORTING OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DATA BY HEALTH
INSURERS AND MANAGED CARE PLANS (2004), available at http://omhrc.gov (follow
“Data/statistics” hyperlink; then follow “Assessment of State Laws, Regulations and
Practices Affecting the Collection and Reporting of Racial and Ethnic Data by Health
Insurers and Managed Care Plans” hyperlink) (describing state laws targeting discrimination
by health care providers). The study concluded that most states provide protection against
“racial” discrimination. Id.
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No person shall, directly or indirectly, refuse to, withhold from or deny
to any person . . . accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges
thereof because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry,
nor shall distinction be made with respect to any person based on race,
color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry in connection with the
price or quality of any item, goods or services offered by or at any place
of public accommodation.231

The states’ definitions of “public accommodation” vary. Twenty states
consider “all establishments which cater or offer their services, facilities or
goods to or solicit patronage from the members of the general public”232 or
some similar variation233 to be places of public accommodation. One must
look to each state’s common law to determine which types of health care
facilities are covered.
Other states are more specific. California, for example, forbids
discrimination “in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”234
Ten states include clinics and hospitals in their statutory definitions of
“public accommodation” but exclude private health care providers or
insurance providers.235 Washington state covers any place “where medical
service or care is made available,”236 and Nevada specifies that an “office
of a provider of health care” is a place of public accommodation.237
Furthermore, the District of Columbia, Nevada, and Ohio include insurers
and insurance offices in their definitions of places of public
accommodation.238 Other states direct laws specifically at HMOs. For
example, Colorado’s statute establishes that “[n]o HMO shall unfairly
231. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442 (2004).
232. Id. § 41-1441.
233. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a63 (West Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 67-5902
(2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-2-1 (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE § 216.2 (2000); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2232 (2003); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 37.2302 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 (West
Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02
(2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.400 (2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (1998); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-7-2 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (1993); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3
(LexisNexis 2002).
234. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 2005).
235. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 489-2 (LexisNexis
2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-101 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (l) (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 40 (McKinney 1992); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1124-3 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-9-10 (Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52(1)(e)(1)
(West Supp. 2004).
236. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (West 2002).
237. NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (2003); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A2 (XIV)
(Supp. 2004) (providing that in New Hampshire, a “health care provider” is a place of
public accommodation).
238. D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02 (24) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (2003); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-02 (I) (2004).
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discriminate against any enrollee based on . . . race.”239
Medical facilities and health care providers who base treatment decisions
on their assumptions about an individual’s “race” may be guilty of
violating these civil rights laws if harm results from their actions. Under
state law, a provider who declines to consider various therapeutic options
because of a patient’s apparent “race” may be a covered entity that is
engaging in “race-based” discrimination.240
2. Hospital and medical facility licensing requirements
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas require that
medical facilities licensed to operate in the state241 agree to provide
nondiscriminatory care. Pennsylvania’s statute, for example, mandates that
“no provider shall discriminate in the operation of a health care facility on
the basis of race . . . .”242 Rhode Island establishes that health services
providers must provide health services without regard to a person’s “race”
and that violators will be denied certification.243 Other states require
239. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 4-7-2 (2003); accord FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.22 (4) (West
2005) (“The procedures for offering comprehensive health care services . . . will not unfairly
discriminate on the basis of age, sex, race . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH—GEN. § 19-710
(h) (LexisNexis 2005) (“The procedures for offering health care services . . . may not
discriminate unfairly on the basis of age, sex, race . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
500.3519(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (“A health maintenance organization [(“HMO”)]
contract . . . shall not discriminate on the basis of race . . . .”); N.M. CODE R. §
13.10.13.22(A) (2005) (“No health care insurer or health care facility or provider through
which the health care insurer has made arrangements to provide health care services shall
discriminate against any enrollee by: . . . altering the terms of an existing health benefits
contract and the quality of health care services rendered or to be rendered because of the
enrollee’s: (1) gender, race . . . .”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 98-1.11 (2005)
(requiring that each HMO shall not discriminate on the basis of “race” when providing
services); 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 20.0202(13) (1997) (requiring that all contracts between
providers and network plan carriers contain a provision that the provider “shall not
discriminate against members on the basis of race . . . .”); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-06-07-05
(2005) (prohibiting HMOs from unfairly discriminating against enrollees or applicants on
the basis of “race”); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 69-22 (1989) (prohibiting HMOs from
discriminating against any enrollee or applicant on the basis of “race”); 14 VA. ADMIN.
CODE 5-210-80(C)(1) (2005) (prohibiting HMOs from discriminating against any enrollee
on the basis of “race”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-15(e) (LexisNexis 2003) (prohibiting
“prepaid limited health service organization[s]” from discriminating in the quality of
services on the basis of “race”); Id. § 33-25A-14a(d) (prohibiting HMOs from
discriminating in the quality of services on the basis of “race”).
240. Similarly, in some states, an insurer that refuses to cover testing or treatment for an
individual may be violating civil rights laws. See infra Part IV.B.5.
241. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 448.801a (West 2003) (stating that licensure is typically
required “to protect and promote the public health and welfare through the establishment
and enforcement of regulations setting minimum standards in the construction, maintenance
and operation of health care facilities.”).
242. Id. § 448.804(a); see also 105 MASS. CODE REGS. § 130.206 (2001) (providing that
“[n]o hospital shall discriminate in the provision of service against any person on the basis
of race . . . .”); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.16(d)(9) (2005) (applying exclusively to
emergency medical services providers); 14-090-007 R.I. CODE R. § 18.2 (2004) (requiring
only that hospitals do not deny admission based on a patient’s “race”).
243. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-62-11 (1998).
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compliance with Patients’ Bill of Rights laws, which prohibit “racial”
discrimination, as a condition of licensure.244 These statutes bind the
facilities at issue, even if they are not considered places of public
accommodation for purposes of civil rights law.245
3. Patients’ bill of rights laws
Several states have Patient Bill of Rights laws that prohibit “race”
discrimination in health care. Some states passed patient rights laws as
individual statutes,246 while others placed patient rights provisions within
more comprehensive laws.247 The Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities is the most sweeping law of its kind. It provides in part
that “[a] patient has the right to impartial access to medical treatment or
accommodations, regardless of race, national origin, religion, handicap, or
source of payment.”248 New Jersey’s law guarantees the right “[t]o
treatment without discrimination as to race”249 but applies only to patients
in hospitals, while other state laws cover long term care, surgical centers,
and home health agencies.250
Patients who receive different treatment because of “race-based”
practices and are harmed as a result, may suffer a violation of their rights
under the law. Some patients’ rights statutes expressly authorize a private
cause of action.251 The New York statute does not, but a court found that it
244. E.g., 175 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 9-006.04 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21
(Supp. 2004); N.M. CODE R. § 7.7.2.19 (2005); Id. § 7.8.2.34; 14-090-007 R.I. CODE R. § 15
(2004).
245. See N.M. CODE R. § 7.7.2.19 (requiring hospitals to have written policies approved
by the governing board that detail patients’ rights and responsibilities, including a provision
stating that “patients may not be denied appropriate hospital care because of the patient’s
race . . . .”).
246. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2005); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-343b (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.20201 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2H-12.8 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-3 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.7 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.13 (LexisNexis
2002).
247. E.g., 40-700-014 DEL. CODE REGS. § 014 (Weil 2005); 16-4000-4405 DEL. CODE
REGS. § 16.0 (Weil 2005); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03-10.1-10(6)(a)(5) (1998).
248. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2005).
249. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(p) (West 2005).
250. See, e.g., 40-700-014 DEL. CODE REGS. § 014 (Weil 2005) (long term care); 164000-4405 DEL. CODE REGS. § 1.0 (Weil 2005) (free standing surgical centers); KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. § 28-34-3b (2005) (hospitals); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10,
§ 405.7(c) (2005) (hospitals); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03-10.1 (1998) (home health
agencies).
251. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-4.2 (West 1997) (providing a cause of action against
nursing homes for violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:13-1-30:13-4.1, which outlines
nursing home responsibilities and rights of residents); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.17(I)
(LexisNexis 2002) (giving nursing home residents a private cause of action against “any
person or home” committing a violation of nursing home patients’ bill of rights outlined in
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3721.10-3721.17 (LexisNexis 2002)); Sprosty v. Pearlview, Inc.,
666 N.E.2d 1180, 1184-84 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1995) (holding that OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
3721.17(I) permits an award of punitive damages for violation of the patients’ bill of rights);
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nevertheless included an implied right of private action.252
Other states provide only for administrative enforcement, while still
others allow for patient grievances but fail to empower state agencies to
fine violators or provide meaningful relief to aggrieved parties. In
Michigan, while no private right of action exists,253 patients are entitled to
reimbursement by the offending facility upon an administrative finding of a
statutory violation.254 Florida requires that copies of the patient’s bill of
rights be available to patients, imposes penalties for those who violate this
requirement,255 and enables patients to file grievances with the offending
health care providers or the state licensing agency.256 Similarly, hospitals
in Kansas must inform patients of their rights during admission257 and
“establish a mechanism for responding to patient complaints.”258 Delaware
patients in long-term care facilities can report mistreatment to the Patient
Rights Unit259 or other agencies,260 and medical facilities must inform them
in writing of their right to do so.261 North Dakota’s statute has a more
limited scope. It applies only to home health agencies and requires
government monitoring to ensure compliance with the anti-discrimination
mandate.262

see also Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients’ Bill of Rights: Winners and
Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 91-95 (2001) (listing state patient bills of rights).
252. See McDonald v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 203 A.D.2d 6, 610 N.Y.S.2d 13
(1994) (finding that the state statute established an implied private right of action in a case
in which the hospital failed to provide a licensed psychiatrist to supervise residents).
253. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.20203 (LexisNexis 2001) (“The rights and
responsibilities prescribed in sections 20201 and 20202 are guidelines for health facilities,
facility staff, facility employees, patients, and residents. An individual shall not be civilly or
criminally liable for failure to comply with those sections.”).
254. See id. § 333.21799c(4) (stating that the Department of Health must order a facility
in violation of the patient rights law to pay the patient $100.00 or reimburse patient for
injuries or costs, whichever is greater).
255. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026(6) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring health care
providers to make a written copy of the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities
available to patients); Id. § 381.0261(4) (providing for an administrative fine if a health care
facility does not make the patient’s bill of rights available to a patient). For initial nonwillful violations, the health care facility does not receive an administrative fine. Id. For
subsequent violations, the Agency for Health Care Administration may fine the facility up to
$5,000 for non-willful violations and up to $25,000 for intentional and willful violations.
Id.
256. See id. § 381.026(6) (stating that a patient can air grievances with the facility or
provider serving her, as well as with the state licensing agency when a right has been
violated).
257. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-34-3b(10) (2005).
258. Id. § 28-34-3b(10)(b).
259. See 40-700-014 DEL. CODE REGS. § (V)(I) (Weil 2005) (listing the phone number
and address for county Patient Rights Units).
260. See id. (listing the Division of Public Health, State Human Relations Commission,
Dep’t of Health and Social Services, and Office of Civil Rights addresses to which patients
can send correspondence regarding discriminatory practices).
261. Id. § (III)(1), (2).
262. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-03-10.1-10 (1998).
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4. Public services regulation
Many states prohibit discrimination on the basis of “race” in the
distribution of state services, including Medicaid. Most of these states
prohibit discrimination by state staff at public facilities as well as by any
private provider or contractor who receives state funds to provide medical
services and any health care facilities enrolled as state Medicaid
providers.263
To illustrate, Arizona mandates that “[a] contractor, provider, and
nonprovider shall not discriminate against an eligible person or member
because of race . . . .”264 Other statutes’ wording differs to some extent,
with different state laws addressing discrimination in enrollment, the
provision of services, access to services, or separate treatment practices.265
Therefore, covered physicians and medical facilities that make therapeutic
decisions based purely on a patient’s “race” and thereby cause harm, could
be acting in violation of these laws.
263. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 560-X-1-.07(2) (Supp. 1997) (“Compliance with
Federal Civil Rights and Rehabilitation Acts is required of all providers participating in the
Alabama Medicaid Program.”); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 9-22-513 (2004) (“A contractor,
provider, and nonprovider shall not discriminate against an eligible person or member
because of race . . . .”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 350-1-.05 (1989) (“[N]o individual shall be
excluded from participation, or be denied benefits, or be subjected to any other form of
discrimination by the Department or providers of medical assistance, by reason of handicap,
race, color, sex, age, religion, or national origin.”); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 10-2.010
(2002) (“This rule specifies civil rights compliance requirements for all health service
providers and contractors who provide services for the Department of Health and for all
hospitals and public health clinics that receive federal financial assistance or
reimbursements for services provided.”).
264. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R9-22-513 (A) (2004).
265. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 56-X-1-.07(1) (Supp. 1997); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 78.130 (2004); Id. tit. 7, § 43.070; COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-19-110 (2004); CONN.
AGENCIES REGS. § 17b-262-526(1) (2004); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 22, § 4405.2 (2004); id. tit.
22, § 5509.1; id. tit. 29, § 948.1; id. tit. 29, § 5319.1; id. tit. 29, § 5413.1; id. tit. 29,
§ 5618.1; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59G-8.100(23) (2005); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 350-1.05 (1989); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.09.026 (2003); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1
(West Supp. 2005); 405 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-1-2 (2005); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-88.2
(3)(e) (2005); id. § 441-152.2(10); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-2-1 (2005); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 205.640(7) (West 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:437.11(A) (1999); MD. CODE
REGS. 10.09.36.03(A)(7) (2005); id. § 10.09.64.07(C); id. § 10.09.65.02(C); 130 MASS.
CODE REGS. 450.202(B) (2005); id. § 501.009(A) (2002); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
400.7172(2) (1999); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 10-2.010 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §
53-6-105 (2003); id. § 37.85.402(6); NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 2-001.04 (2005); N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 10:72-1.7 (1998); N.M. CODE R. § 8.302.1.14 (2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 515.2(b)(13) (2001); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 28B.0401 (2005); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 5101:3-26-12(C)(5)(h) (2004); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 317:25-7-25(e) (2004);
OR. ADMIN. R. 410-120-1380(1)(c) (2005); id. § 461-105-0010; Id. 461-105-0190(8); 55 PA.
CODE § 1101.51(b) (2000); 15-020-001 R.I. CODE R. § 0122 (Weil 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §
126-125 (1992); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:16:01:18 (2003); id. § 67:42:01:13; TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. 1200-13-1-.05(9) (2005); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 37.67 (2004); id. § 39.21; id. §
448.207 (2004); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 414-1-10 (2004); 13-170-001 VT. CODE R. §2000(3)
(2004); 12 VA ADMIN. CODE § 30-10-970 (2005); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § HFS 104.01(1)
(2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-107(b) (2005). But cf. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-26-02
(2004) (requiring nondiscrimination in admissions only).
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5. Insurance codes
A few states explicitly prohibit “race” discrimination by insurers.
Insurers who refused to cover diagnostic tests or treatments ordered by a
health care provider because they did not consider them appropriate for
someone of the patient’s “race” could be deemed to have violated these
laws. New Jersey, for example, mandates that insurers may not make or
permit any policy “which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation or
discrimination as to race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry”266
Nevada’s insurance statute is somewhat narrower and provides that
“[r]isks may be classified in any reasonable way for the establishment of
rates and minimum premiums, except that classifications may not be based
on race, color, creed or national origin . . . .”267 The statute does not
address denial of coverage for particular treatments based on a patient’s
“race.” However, if an insurer issuing individual policies268 attempted to
266. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4(7)(c), (d) (West 2004); accord CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1365.5(b) (West 2000) (stating that terms of a health care service plan contract may
“not be modified, and the benefits or coverage of any contract shall not be subject to any
limitations, exceptions, exclusions, reductions, copayments, coinsurance, deductibles,
reservations, or premium, price, or charge differentials, or other modifications because of
the race . . . of any contracting party.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(22)(a) (2000) (“It
shall be unlawful practice for any insurance company licensed to do business in this state to
discriminate in any way because of the insured’s race . . . .”); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/424(3) (West Supp. 2005) (defining unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices as: “Making or permitting, in the case of insurance . . . any
unfair discrimination between individuals . . . because of the race . . . of such insurance risks
or applicants.”); 20 ILL. CODE R. 2051.55(c)(2)(L) (Weil 2005) (requiring that all health
insurance preferred provider agreements contain a “provision stating that the provider will
provide health care services without discrimination against any beneficiary on the basis
of . . . ethnicity . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-910(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (“A health
network may not deny health care services to an enrollee on the basis of gender, race . . . .”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-12 (LexisNexis 2000) (“No insurer shall, on the basis of the
race . . . of any individual or group of persons: . . . treat any such applicant or insured
differently than any other applicant or insured with respect to the terms, conditions, rates,
benefits or requirements of any such insurance contract.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1751.18(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2004) (prohibiting any “health insuring corporation, or health
care facility or provider through which the health insuring corporation has made
arrangements to provide health care services” from discriminating against anyone in “the
quality of health care services rendered” on the basis of “race”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 586-10(2) (2004) (prohibiting government insurers that discriminate on the basis of “race”
from transacting insurance in the state).
267. NEV. REV. STAT. 686B.060(2) (2003); accord ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-209(b)
(2001) (“Risks may be classified in any reasonable way . . . except that no risks may be
grouped by classifications based in whole or in part on race, color, creed, or national origin
of the risk.”); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(a) (West 2005) (“Race, color, religion, national
origin, ancestry, or sexual orientation shall not, of itself, constitute a condition or risk for
which a higher rate, premium, or charge may be required of the insured for that insurance.”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-14-105(b) (2005) (“Risks may be classified in any way except that
no risk may be classified in whole or in part on the basis of race, color, creed or national
origin.”).
268. See supra note 200 (explaining that the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act prevents insurers from discriminating in group plans based on “any
health status-related factor” while offering no explicit protection for individual insurance
plans); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b)(1) (2003).
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charge African-Americans as a class higher rates or premiums because they
were all perceived as more prone to disease or less easily treatable by
standard therapy, the state could find the insurer in violation of the law.
State mandates, however, will not protect patients enrolled in self-funded
employee benefit plans.269 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”),270 a federal law, preempts state laws regulating insurance with
respect to self-funded plans, rendering them unenforceable.271 This
exception is quite consequential because a growing number of employers
are self-insured.272
C. Violation of Research Regulations and Guidelines
The best source of protection for the American public might be NIH
guidelines273 and federal research regulations that will govern many
“racially-tailored” research studies. Clinical trials that include only one
population or deliberately exclude particular population groups could
violate NIH and federal agency rules.
1. NIH policy and guidelines
Researchers seeking NIH funding who include only members of one
population in a clinical trial may violate the NIH Policy and Guidelines on
the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research.274
The Guidelines state the following:
It is the policy of NIH that women and members of minority groups and
their subpopulations must be included in all NIH-funded clinical
research, unless a clear and compelling rationale and justification
establishes to the satisfaction of the relevant Institute/Center Director
that inclusion is inappropriate with respect to the health of the subjects or
the purpose of the research . . . . Cost is not an acceptable reason for
269. See Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace,
in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281,
293 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). Self-insured employers directly assume responsibility
for paying their employees’ medical claims rather than contracting with a commercial
insurer that collects premiums and serves as a third party payer. Every medical claim
translates into an out-of-pocket expense for these employers. Id.
270. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
271. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (“We read the . . . [statute]
to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ . . . .” (citing
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A))); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 735 n.14
(1985) (recognizing that ERISA preempts application of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law to self-insured health benefit plans).
272. See Rothstein, supra note 269, at 293 (observing that in 1993, ninety-three percent
of employers with more than 40,000 employees were self-insured, as were eighty-five
percent of employers with 5,000-40,000 employees, and thirty-seven percent of those with
50-199 employees).
273. See NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 90 (providing guidance concerning the inclusion
of minority populations in research studies and the reporting of research data).
274. Id.

HOFFMAN OFFTOPRINTER

436

2/24/2006 2:00:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:395

exclusion except when the study would duplicate data from other
sources.275

Researchers who seek to exclude particular minority groups from their
clinical studies in an attempt to develop therapies for a different “racial”
population (e.g. only African-Americans or only Hispanics), risk violation
of these guidelines and denial of NIH funding.276 Investigators would have
to show valid reasons for excluding all members of a particular minority.
Because so many Americans are of mixed ancestral origin and because
genetic variations are shared across population lines,277 the NIH should
rarely, if ever, find a compelling justification for invoking the exception to
the general rule of inclusion. The A-HeFT trial, for example, should be
deemed unacceptable if judged under these guidelines because there was no
evidence that African-Americans are the only individuals who could
benefit from a combination of BiDil and standard therapy.278
While NIH’s rule of inclusion is laudable, its guidelines also feature a
troubling mandate instructing researchers to report “race/ethnicity
differences in the intervention effect” in appropriate circumstances.279 The
guidelines provide the following choices for “ethnic categories”: Hispanic
or Latino and Not Hispanic or Latino.280 The choices for “racial
categories” are: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or
African-American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and White.281
The NIH, therefore, encourages research that focuses on “racial”
differences and requires analyses of “race-based” treatment response
disparities even in research that is not intentionally designed to develop
275. Id.
276. See id. (“The NIH Director may approve, on a case-by-case basis, the exclusion of
subjects, as recommended by the Institute/Center Director, that may be inappropriate to
include within the requirements of these guidelines on the basis of circumstances other than
the health of the subjects, the purpose of the research, or costs.”).
277. See supra notes 99-106 and 128-131 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part I.A (discussing the A-HeFT trial).
279. See NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 90 (describing the proper protocol for conducting
sex/gender and ethnic/“racial” analyses and stating that publication submissions are strongly
encouraged to include the results of “racial” and gender analyses).
280. Id. It is not clear why Hispanic or Latino are considered “ethnic” categories, while
other classification are considered “racial.” See supra note 177 and accompanying text
(discussing the ambiguities of the term “ethnicity”).
281. NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 90. The Guidelines further recognize that the
changing “racial” and ethnic composition of the U.S. population reflects increasing diversity
and changing demographics.
Id.
The terms “minority groups” and “minority
subpopulations” are meant to include, rather than exclude, different “racial” and ethnic
groups. Id. The categories provided by NIH are consistent with those of the Office of
Management and Budget Directive No. 15, which lists the basic “racial” and ethnic
categories that the federal government is to utilize for purposes of statistical, administrative,
and civil rights compliance reports. OFF. OF MGT. AND BUDGET, STANDARDS FOR
MAINTAINING, COLLECTING, AND PRESENTING FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY
(1997), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/ombdir15
.html.
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“racially-tailored” therapies. This approach has been criticized by other
commentators and ought to be rejected.282 It could constitute an incentive
for sloppy science in which response differences are attributed to the
subjects’ self-selected “racial” identity without deeper analysis of socioeconomic conditions, genetic variations, and other factors.
A better alternative has been adopted by several prestigious publications,
including Nature Genetics and the Journal of the American Medical
Association (“JAMA”). Rather than encourage the use of “racial”
categorization, these journals require authors who analyze data by subpopulation to justify their doing so and to explain how they constructed
their classifications.283 JAMA specifically encourages investigators to
measure a number of different variables, including “socioeconomic status,
education, urban vs. rural location, or income region by ZIP code” in order
to determine the true reasons for the outcome at issue.284 In the words of
the Nature Genetics editors, “this will raise awareness and inspire more
rigorous design of genetic and epidemiological studies.”285
2. Federal research regulations
The federal research regulations govern a large portion of research
studies that are conducted in the United States. The FDA regulations apply
to clinical trials that are designed to develop new drugs, medical devices,
and biological products, such as vaccines and blood products.286 While
clinical trials involving treatments other than drugs and devices, such as
surgery or bone marrow transplants, do not fall within the FDA’s
jurisdiction, they are subject to U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) regulation if they are “conducted, supported or otherwise
subject to regulation by any federal department or agency.”287
The federal regulations may serve as a further constraint upon “racebased” research as both FDA and HHS regulations instruct Institutional
Review Boards (“IRBs”), which review and approve research projects,288 to
282. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 173, at 1033-36; Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 10,
at 451-55; Bamshad, supra note 119, at 945.
283. See Editorial, Census, Race and Science, 24 NATURE GENETICS 97, 98 (2000)
(encouraging reviewers of manuscripts to critically analyze research focusing on “race”);
Winker, supra note 15, at 1614 (encouraging authors who analyze results by “race” to rely
on self-designation but cautioning that such analysis, which has become a “knee jerk
reflex,” must be thoroughly justified).
284. Winker, supra note 15, at 1614 .
285. Census, Race and Science, supra note 283, at 98.
286. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a) (2005); see also U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
http://www.fda.gov/comments/regs.html (describing items regulated by the FDA).
287. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005).
288. Federal regulations mandate that all research conducted, supported, or regulated by
HHS, the FDA, or another federal agency must be overseen by an IRB, a committee
constituted to provide initial approval and periodic monitoring for biomedical research
studies. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101, 56.102(g), 56.103 (2005); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(a), 46.102(g)
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pay particular attention to the selection criteria for human subjects.
Specifically, the regulations provide:
Selection of subjects is equitable. In making this assessment the IRB
should take into account the purposes of the research and the setting in
which the research will be conducted and should be particularly
cognizant of the special problems of research involving vulnerable
populations, such as . . . economically or educationally disadvantaged
persons.289

Investigators who design “racially-tailored” clinical trials subject to
federal regulation risk violating this mandate by selecting enrollees in an
inequitable fashion. If a high risk study includes members of only one
minority, that minority group will disproportionately bear the burdens of
the research. On the other hand, if the experimental treatment holds
promise of significant benefits for participants, then all but the members of
the selected minority will be deprived of the opportunity to enjoy those
benefits during clinical trials.
Furthermore, if a study focusing on a particular minority includes a large
number of economically or educationally disadvantaged individuals,
investigators who are eager to recruit and retain subjects might be
insensitive to their limitations and vulnerabilities. Thus, extra care must be
taken to ensure that potential subjects fully understand the trial and its
implications and are not coerced into enrolling.290 These concerns will be
acute if English is not the subjects’ first language (which may be the case
for many Hispanics or Asians), if there is a placebo control arm that
deprives subjects of standard therapy,291 or if enrollees are offered generous
financial incentives, which some may feel unable to decline.292

(2005). The IRB’s primary role is to safeguard the rights and welfare of human subjects.
21 C.F.R. § 56.108.
289. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3).
290. See Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible
Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 484-90 (2001) (discussing the
difficulties of obtaining meaningful informed consent from research participants and the
flaws of the typical informed consent process).
291. See id. at 452-60 (discussing placebo controls and concerns about their use); see
also infra text accompanying notes 311-319 (discussing safeguards that should be
implemented for attribute-based research).
292. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM., DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
UNDUE INDUCEMENT, reprinted in Undue Influence and Coercion, http://alumni.imsa.
edu/~jason/ethics_topics/undue.html (stating that monetary payments can induce subjects to
participate in research); OFF. OF RES. SUPPORT COMMS., THE UNIV. OF TEX. HEALTH SCI.
CENTER AT HOUSTON, GUIDELINES FOR PAYMENT/REIMBURSEMENT OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS,
available at http://www.uth.tmc.edu/ut_general/research_acad_
aff/orsc/cphs/guidelines/pay.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) (prohibiting “monetary
inducements to be utilized to recruit subjects for studies involving significant risk or
excessive pain or discomfort”).

HOFFMAN OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 2:00:15 PM

“RACIALLY-TAILORED” MEDICINE UNRAVELED

439

D. Discrimination Theory
The law’s anti-discrimination mandates do not categorically prohibit
differential treatment. Rather, with respect to certain conduct, the law
requires that those who wish to treat individuals differently ask the right
questions and do so with adequate justification. Likewise, attribute-based
medicine, which can be discriminatory by nature if the attributes at issue
are possessed primarily by members of a particular protected class, should
not be conducted unless the patient group that will benefit from the
treatment has been carefully and accurately identified.
To illustrate this principle, I will focus on a few well-known antidiscrimination laws and on two provisions that govern biomedical research,
as discussed above.293 The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause
generally prohibits discrimination by governmental actors294 but allows it
when a compelling governmental interest justifies the conduct at issue, and
when the government narrowly tailors its conduct to achieve the
compelling goal.295 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employment discrimination based on “race,” color, national origin, sex, and
religion,296 but allows discrimination where “religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”297 Thus, an
employer might be able to discriminate in hiring actors of a particular
gender or national origin for the sake of depicting authentic and believable
characters, to hire only females to serve as attendants in women’s dressing
rooms out of respect for the privacy of female customers, and to employ
only male guards in high security male prisons because of safety
concerns.298 Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)299
prohibits employment discrimination based on disability, but authorizes
293. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing NIH and regulatory research guidelines).
294. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Equal Protection Clause and its applicability to
“race-based” medicine).
295. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 899 (1996) (holding that North Carolina’s
districting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to
to serve a compelling state interest); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 900 (1995) (finding
that Georgia’s districting plan violated the Equal Protection clause).
296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
297. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). Note that “race” and color are not included in the list of
allowable exceptions. However, in rare circumstances, the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) defense has been applied to “race” and color discrimination as well.
See JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 173-74 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing affirmative action programs, the hiring
of actors for “race”-specific roles, and law enforcement positions that might require “racial”
hiring). The authors argue that taking “race” into account is “common sense” in some
situations. Id. For example, if a motion picture about Thurgood Marshall is being cast,
auditioning a white actor would be senseless. Id.
298. See id. at 171-72 (discussing BFOQ defenses based on authenticity, privacy, and
safety needs).
299. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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employers to exclude a candidate or employee if that employee cannot be
reasonably accommodated by the employer300 or will constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of himself or others in the workplace.301
In the research arena, the NIH Guidelines mandate inclusion of
minorities in clinical studies unless concern about the subject’s health or
the research purpose militates against inclusive selection criteria.302
Similarly, the federal regulations require equitable selection of subjects but
enable IRBs to “take into account the purposes of the research and the
setting in which the research will be conducted” in evaluating whether
subjects are recruited properly.303
While all of the above-described provisions generally constitute antidiscrimination mandates, they allow for selectivity, exclusion, or actions
that adversely affect a protected class under particular, defensible
circumstances. Likewise, this Article does not per se argue against
attribute-based medicine. It does, however, contend that this approach
must not be practiced in an irresponsible or unjustifiably discriminatory
fashion. Basing research design or medical decisions solely on an
individual’s “race” is not sound methodology because “race” lacks a
coherent meaning.304 Medical researchers and health care providers must
focus on more sophisticated and revealing classifications. It is clear that
there are differences in treatment responses among individuals, and
certainly investigators may categorize these individuals into particular
groups. The proper classifications might involve genetic variation, origin
in a specific geographic area, socio-economic status, diet, exercise, or other
factors,305 and if these are meaningful predictors of illness or appropriate
treatment course, they should certainly be considered. Medical decisionmaking that is exclusively “race-based,” however, is contrary to the ethical
and legal norms that govern the practice of medicine.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The advent of BiDil may well portend a future in which researchers
enthusiastically pursue attribute-based medicine.306 While this approach
300. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
301. Id. § 12113(b); see also Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 73 (2002) (holding that
the direct threat defense applies to cases in which job performance would threaten the
applicant’s or employee’s own health even if that applicant or employee did not pose a
direct threat to anyone else in the workplace).
302. NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 90.
303. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2005).
304. See supra Part II (analyzing the meaning of “race” in medicine, genetics, the social
sciences, and the law and arguing that it is an incoherent concept).
305. See supra Part III.A; infra Part V.B.
306. See Bowser, supra note 10, at 1124 (stating that “[o]ther BiDils are sure to surface”
because “researchers are mining through decades of old clinical trials data to find an
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could hold great promise for improving human health, it must be embraced
cautiously. The following section will delineate several safeguards that
should be implemented in order to address the risks and dangers of
attribute-based medicine.
A. Review of Research Studies by Scientific Review Boards and IRBs
Prior to allowing a clinical trial involving human subjects to proceed, the
FDA requires the study’s sponsor to submit an investigational new drug
(“IND”) application.307 The proposal then undergoes an extensive
scientific review process in which groups with expertise in medicine,
chemistry, and pharmacology/toxicology scrutinize the trial to ascertain its
scientific integrity and safety.308 Thus, attribute-based drugs or devices
will be subjected to scientific review by the FDA. In addition, some study
sponsors conduct their own, internal scientific reviews of research
protocols.309 Finally, most clinical trials must be approved by IRBs,
institutional entities that are charged with the responsibility of safeguarding
the welfare of research participants.310 Both scientific review boards and
IRBs should subject attribute-based studies to particular scrutiny.
1. Scientific reviews
Scientific review boards should carefully review clinical trials that
exclude particular populations in order to determine whether the trial
design is justified by existing data. The A-HeFT study, for example, has
been criticized for including only African-Americans and failing to
examine whether the combination of BiDil and standard therapy would
benefit non African-Americans.311 Clinical trials should not be constructed
to develop therapy for only one population group unless there is good
reason to believe that others will not benefit from it. Moreover, as
overlooked differential racial response to drugs”).
307. 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(c) (2005). In the IND application, the sponsor must detail the
outcomes of animal studies, submit drug manufacturing data, and provide information
concerning the study’s design. Id. § 312.23; see also Barbara Ann Binzak, How
Pharmacogenomics Will Impact the Federal Regulation of Clinical Trials and the New
Drug Approval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 117 (2003) (noting that the practical
purpose of the IND application is to determine whether it is safe to proceed with clinical
trials in humans, and the legal reason for submitting an IND is to receive an exemption from
federal statutes that prohibit unapproved drugs from being shipped in interstate commerce).
308. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 15-16.
309. See CYSTINOSIS RES. NETWORK, GRANT PROPOSAL GUIDELINES (2003), available at
http://www.cystinosis.org/grantguidelines.html (discussing scientific review board review of
research proposals submitted to the Cystinosis Research Network); Kennedy’s Disease
Ass’n, Sci. Rev. Bd., http://www.kennedysdisease.org/aboutus_bo
ard.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2005) (detailing each board member’s qualifications for serving
on the scientific review board).
310. 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2005).
311. See Kahn, supra note 64, at 481; Bloche, supra note 39, at 2036.
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discussed below, if only one population will be included, the contours of
the population should be thoughtfully and accurately delineated.
Scientific review boards should encourage researchers, who will rely on
self-identification for purposes of inclusion criteria, to take into account the
limitations of this mechanism.312 In the 2000 census, almost seven million
Americans indicated that they belonged to two or more “races.”313 In
addition, many more individuals consider themselves to be of mixed origin
and have genetic admixtures.314 If a study that is designed to be
population-exclusive has numerous subjects that self-identify as members
of a particular “race” when forced to check a box but who have substantial
ancestral mixing, its results might be skewed and inaccurate. As a recent
study concluded, “significant population substructure differences exist that
self-reported race alone does not capture.”315 Researchers who believe that
ancestry might be informative for research purposes should not only
require self-identification, but also should ask subjects specific questions
about their ancestries in order to gather more accurate information about
potential genetic admixture or origin in a relevant sub-population.316
Furthermore, scientific review boards should require investigators to
formulate careful hypotheses regarding factors that will influence treatment
response.317 If applicable, they should control for genetic, psychosocial,
economic, environmental, cultural, educational and other elements that
might provide a partial or complete explanation for treatment response rate
differences.318 These could include specific alleles, diet, exercise, stress,
312. As noted in Part II.A, Neil Risch and his colleagues analyzed DNA samples and
found that the samples clustered into four major groups that corresponded to the subjects’
self-identified “race.” See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text. The components
they analyzed, however, were microsatellites, non-functional DNA that are highly
illuminating with respect to group differences but not relevant to health status and other
medical information. Id. Furthermore, they did not focus on individuals of mixed “race”
origins. Id.
313. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE, supra note 12.
314. See supra notes 156-157.
315. See Jill S. Barnholtz-Sloan et al., Examining Population Stratification via
Individual Ancestry Estimates versus Self-Reported Race, 14 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1545, 1550 (2005) (finding that the risk genotype at issue
“varied substantially within self-reported racial group by individual ancestry and casecontrol status”).
316. See Bamshad, supra note 119, at 945 (stating that if ancestry is relevant, “using race
rather than geography or explicit genetic data to infer ancestry will be less useful for making
decisions about disease risk or treatment response”); see also supra notes 55-60 and
accompanying text (discussing studies that have found that origin in a specific country or
geographic location and socioeconomic factors are relevant to health status).
317. See Bamshad, supra note 119, at 945 (stating that “[m]ost health-related traits, such
as susceptibility to diabetes, obesity, infection, and cancer, are complex traits influenced by
the combined effects of several or more gene variants, each with a modest effect, together
with the environment”).
318. See Hacking, supra note 15, at 109 (stating that BiDil might be particularly
effective for African Americans because of social factors, such as diet); Shields et al., supra
note 15, at 96 (recommending measurement of “specific social dimensions known to have

HOFFMAN OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

“RACIALLY-TAILORED” MEDICINE UNRAVELED

2/24/2006 2:00:15 PM

443

exposure to environmental toxins, or cultural and religious barriers to
treatment compliance.319
A book by Anne Fadiman entitled The Spirit Catches You and You Fall
Down320 highlights potential social, religious, and cultural hurdles to the
receipt of optimal health care.321 It follows an immigrant Hmong family,
whose young daughter suffers from severe epilepsy, through years of
encounters with American medical and social service systems.322 Despite
everyone’s best intentions, the daughter’s medical treatment fails time and
again.323 The family has difficulty obtaining adequate translations during
doctors’ visits; the doctors, who are eager to improve the youngster’s
condition, frequently alter medication dosages so that the parents are
unable to follow the ever-changing instructions; and some of the parents’
religious beliefs impede both their comprehension of medical
circumstances and their acceptance of recommended treatments.324 This
experience surely is not unique.325 Thus, while particular communities that
are involved in clinical trials may demonstrate unusual therapeutic
responses, these phenomena might be related to cultural elements or
compliance difficulties.326 Although controlling for many variables will
likely be more difficult and costly than differentiating subjects based only
on “race,” it is the only way to achieve accurate study outcomes.

an impact on health and health outcomes”); Winker, supra note 15, at 1614 (encouraging
investigators to measure a number of different variables, rather than to focus exclusively on
“race,” in order to ensure the most accurate evaluation of the outcome at issue); Race,
Ethnicity, and Genetics Working Group of the Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., The
Use of Racial, Ethnic, and Ancestral Categories in Human Genetics Research, 77 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 519, 519 (2005) (“Investigations that fail to recognize and acknowledge the
full range of mechanisms through which designations of race, ethnicity, and ancestry can
correlate with personal traits and outcomes threaten to reinforce widely held stereotypes.”).
319. See supra Part III.A (discussing purported “race-based” outcome differentials and
the “non-racial” factors to which they might in truth be attributed).
320. ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL DOWN (1997).
321. See id. at 83-84, 186-90 (discussing cultural and social impediments to medical
care).
322. See id. at 110-13, 176-80, 219-24 (documenting the parents’ increasing frustration
with American medical care and their impression that American medical care was the cause
of their child’s health problems).
323. See id. (describing the extent to which the parents went to obtain traditional medical
care for their daughter).
324. See id. at 83-84, 110-13, 176-80, 219-24.
325. See id. at 83 (discussing the manner in which Hmong attitudes toward parental
responsibility conflict with American beliefs).
326. See Shankar Vedantam, Racial Disparities Found in Pinpointing Mental Illness,
WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at A16 (reporting that Blacks in the United States were more
than four times as likely than Whites to be diagnosed with schizophrenia). The article noted
one expert’s warning that “there is a risk a psychiatrist with a different cultural experience
than a patient can misinterpret the expression of a psychiatric symptom.” Id. It further
described “‘focus units’—inpatient psychiatric centers that focus on how culture and
ethnicity influence psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.” Id.
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2. Institutional review boards
IRBs do not review the scientific validity of clinical trial proposals, but
rather, are entrusted with safeguarding the welfare of human subjects.327
IRBs should be particularly vigilant when reviewing attribute-based
protocols that are targeted at particular population groups.328 The federal
regulations mandate that the selection of participants be equitable.329 IRBs,
like scientific review boards, should scrutinize population-specific
protocols to ensure that the selection criteria are justified by scientific
data.330 IRBs must not approve protocols in which one or more minority
group will bear the burden of undergoing experimental treatments unless
there is sufficient reason to believe that the particular minority or minorities
will benefit from the therapy and that other groups are significantly less
likely to respond positively to the therapy.331 Thus, clinical studies should
not be limited to minorities without data supporting this decision, and the
mere hope that an experimental medication will turn out to be an attributebased drug that will generate high profits for the drug manufacturer should
not justify discriminatory inclusion and exclusion criteria.
The problem is exacerbated if many of the minority subjects are likely to
be economically disadvantaged.332 If that is the case, the informed consent
process should be designed to be comprehended by subjects with limited
educations.333 The informed consent process should include extensive
verbal explanations, and the informed consent document should be kept as
327. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2005) (detailing “[c]riteria for
IRB approval of research”).
328. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3) (2005) (recommending that IRBs take into account
problems that arise in research involving “vulnerable populations”).
329. Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005).
330. Cf. Stuart L. Nightingale, Challenges in Human Subject Protection, 50 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 493, 500-01 (1995) (emphasizing that IRBs may adopt stricter approval criteria
than federal regulations require and recommending that they do so if specific populations
are excluded due to business concerns rather than medical or safety concerns).
331. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(2) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2005) (instructing
IRBs to consider whether the “[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be
expected to result”).
332. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2005) (directing IRBs to be “particularly cognizant of the
special problems of research involving vulnerable populations, such as . . . economically or
educationally disadvantaged persons”).
333. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (detailing requirements for
informed consent and stating that the information conveyed “shall be in language
understandable to the subject or the representative”); see also Hoffman, supra note 290, at
484-90 (discussing the difficulties of obtaining meaningful informed consent from human
subjects); S. Grossman et al., Are Informed Consent Forms That Describe Clinical
Oncology Research Protocols Readable By Most Patients and Their Families?, 12 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2211, 2212 (1994) (finding that the average person cannot read the
typical consent form that describes a clinical oncology protocol because the consent form is
often too complex and the average person reads at approximately an eighth grade reading
level, and the mean grade level required for comprehension of the forms that were studied
was between 11.1 and 14.1, depending on the index used).
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short as possible, with language that is targeted at an adequately low
reading comprehension level.334 Furthermore, any financial incentives that
are provided for enrollment must not be so generous that they are too
tempting for potential subjects and, thereby, essentially coerce
enrollment.335
Finally, the informed consent process should clearly disclose to subjects
that the clinical study is limited to those with particular attributes. Some
individuals may be concerned about potential stigmatization,
discrimination, or other adverse consequences of attribute-based medical
research and practice336 and thus, will consider this information essential to
their decision-making process.
B. Investigators and Health Care Providers
The above discussion of recommendations for scientific review boards
and IRBs has already suggested guidelines for investigators who are
designing attribute-specific clinical trials.337 Researchers should not design
studies to include only one population unless there is sufficient reason to
believe that only that group will benefit from the therapy and that other
groups are significantly less likely to respond well to it. Thus, the reasons
for such a design must be medical rather than related to a desire for profit
or recruitment shortcuts.
If research is to focus on a particular “race,” investigators must be aware
of the limitations of self-identification and its inaccuracies. Furthermore,
researchers should design studies that carefully control for psychosocial,
economic, environmental, cultural, educational, and other non-biological
factors. They must also do everything possible to obtain meaningful
informed consent from subjects who might have limited educations,
reading comprehension levels, and ability to understand medical data. The
informed consent process should include disclosure of the inclusion and
exclusion criteria for the research project.338 Finally, investigators must
offer only modest financial recruitment incentives, if any, so that payments
do not become overly enticing and coercive for economically
disadvantaged subjects.
A few words of caution should be added for medical personnel who do

334. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (instructing IRBs to examine safeguards implemented to
protect economically disadvantaged subjects and other vulnerable populations).
335. See id. (recommending that IRBs examine safeguards that protect participants from
coercion).
336. See supra Part III (discussing the risks and dangers of “racial profiling” in
medicine).
337. See supra Part V.A.
338. See supra Part V.A.2 (detailing concerns that some subjects may have about
participating in attribute-based medical research).
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not design studies but employ attribute-based therapies in their practices.
In order to avoid potential medical malpractice claims and violation of antidiscrimination mandates, health care providers should eschew making
treatment decisions solely based on their judgment of a patient’s “racial”
identity. Precise identification of ancestral origin is difficult if not
impossible to make based on visual observation alone, and efforts to do so
are prone to error. To illustrate, one study analyzed the “racial”
designations of infants who died in their first year of life. The study
showed that 4.3% of babies categorized as Black at birth were deemed to
be other than Black on their death certificates, and thirty-seven percent of
those categorized as Native American on their birth certificates were
classified differently on their death certificates.339 The confusion is often
due to the mixed ancestral origins of so many Americans.340 Another study
that asked respondents to identify “ambiguous race faces” found only a
sixty-eight percent “correct” identification rate.341
Certainly, physicians should discuss genetic testing for the Tay Sachs
allele with Jewish people who are contemplating having a child and genetic
testing for the sickle cell allele with African-Americans who are
considering pregnancy because of the prevalence of the diseases in these
populations. However, physicians should not rely on the fact that an
individual looks Black or non-Black or has a Jewish or non-Jewish
sounding last name in deciding whether to discuss the topic. Instead, they
should ask their patients specific questions about their ancestry.342
Moreover, while one’s ancestry might be relevant to medical care in
limited circumstances, physicians would be misguided to rely on this factor
exclusively for most treatment decisions. Health status and therapeutic
339. Robert A. Hahn et al., Inconsistencies in Coding Race and Ethnicity Between Birth
and Death in US Infants, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 259, 260-61 (1992).
340. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text (emphasizing that seven million
Americans chose two or more “races” by which to describe themselves in the 2000 census).
341. Otto H. MacLin & Roy S. Malpass, Racial Categorization of Faces: The
Ambiguous-Race Face Effect, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 98, 105-06 (2001) (reporting that
in their study, “sixty-eight percent of the Black faces (ambiguous race face + Afro hair
feature) were classified as Black, seven percent as Hispanic, one percent Indian, three
percent White, two percent Asian, and nineteen percent as other” while of “Hispanic faces
(ambiguous race face + Hispanic hair feature), sixty-eight percent were classified as
Hispanic, one percent as Black, seven percent Indian, three percent White, three percent
Asian, and eighteen percent Other”). The faces that were shown to participants were created
using a “facial composite construction kit.” Id. at 105. See also Raymond Bruyer et al.,
Ethnic Categorization of Faces is not Independent of Face Identity, 33 PERCEPTION 169, 169
(2003) (finding that familiarity with particular facial features affected ethnic identification);
Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100
PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 139, 151 (1986) (discussing the variables that influence facial
identification).
342. See Feldman, supra note 126, at 374 (stating that “race is both too broad and too
narrow a definition of ancestry to be biologically useful” and that “[c]onfusing race and
ancestry could be potentially devastating for medical practice”).
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responses will often depend on socio-economic factors, specific alleles that
are shared by several populations, or other elements.343 Health care givers
who will use attribute-based medicine must carefully review current
literature and emerging research results so that they understand its
subtleties. Within their areas of expertise, health care providers must be
familiar with the factors that influence health status and treatment response
and be able to accurately identify the attributes at issue in order to best
serve their patients.
C. Public Discourse Concerning Attribute-Based Medicine: The
Responsibilities of Investigators, Institutions, and the Media
Scientists, research institutions, and the media must act cautiously and
responsibly in generating public discourse about attribute-based medicine.
Medical professionals and journalists should not convey information that is
exaggerated or inflated. They must not fuel the fires of prejudice and
ignorance by reinforcing stereotypes and misconceptions about biological
differences among “races.”
Researchers might be tempted to rush to the media with preliminary,
ambiguous, or questionable research results in order to obtain headlines
that will promote their careers, enhance opportunities for further funding of
their projects,344 or please sponsors who are supporting their studies.345
Investigators have been criticized for seeking publicity for “hot” research
news prematurely,346 either for personal gain or in order to promote the
financial support that is necessary for the maintenance of research
facilities.347 Even if individual researchers are restrained, their institutions
might seek inappropriate media coverage and engage in hyperbole for the
sake of financial and reputational advantage.348
343. See supra Part III.A (relating the dangers of “racial profiling” in medical diagnosis
and research).
344. Dorothy Nelkin, An Uneasy Relationship: The Tensions Between Medicine and The
Media, 347 THE LANCET 1600, 1601 (1996) (relating several examples of researchers who
misrepresented information in an effort to attract venture capital or media attention for their
research). Researchers at the University of Utah, for example, approached the media with
news of cold fusion, hoping to attract venture capital to their research. Id. In another
instance, behavioral psychologists at the University of Minnesota sought press coverage for
studies that had been rejected by peer reviewed journals. Id.; see Douglas G. Altman et al.,
Is There a Case for an International Medical Scientific Press Council?, 272 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 166, 166 (1994) (arguing that researchers have engaged in misconduct because of the
pressure to publish and calling for a code of conduct for editors and an international council
to consider grievances).
345. See Celeste Condit, Science Reporting to the Public: Does the Message Get
Twisted?, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1415, 1416 (2004) (describing the financial,
professional, and commercial pressures faced by medical researchers).
346. See id. (cautioning researchers against answering journalists’ inquiries with an
enthusiastic forecast of a drug’s potential applications).
347. Id.
348. See id. (stating that “scientists and their institutions are increasingly seeking to
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In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) issued
Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility,
and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies,349 which
require federal agencies to develop mechanisms to safeguard the
“objectivity, utility, and integrity” of the information they release.350 Thus,
if governmental entities are involved in the research and are the ones to
engage in media contact, there is greater likelihood that accuracy will be
achieved. Academic institutions should consider developing similar
guidelines to enhance the integrity of the data conveyed to the public.351
At the same time, the media has been criticized for distortions in its
reporting of scientific information.352 Reporters may not fully understand
the data, may oversimplify research results in order to make them
accessible to readers, or may embellish facts in order to foster readers’
interest.353 The media has also been criticized for reporting scientific data
before it has been published in peer reviewed journals and thus, prior to its
validation by experts in the field.354 Journalists may report results that they
know to be preliminary, unclear, or dubious as definitive and
groundbreaking.355 For example, a trial that shows that fifty-four percent of
define science news and to shape the content and style of science communication”); Tania
M. Bubela & Timothy A. Caulfield, Do the Print Media “Hype” Genetic Research? A
Comparison of Newspaper Stories and Peer-Reviewed Research Papers, 170 CAN. MED.
ASS’N J. 1399, 1399 (2004) (describing how the research community may “sell” science to
the public, the scientific community, and research sponsors); Timothy Caulfield,
Biotechnology and the popular press: hype and the selling of science, 22 TRENDS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 337, 338 (2004) (stating that “researchers, research institutions and
reporters can be viewed as inadvertent ‘complicit collaborators’ in the subtle hyping of
science stories”).
349. Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the
Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 49718-25 (Sept. 28, 2001).
350. Id. at 49723.
351. The Guidelines have been criticized for failing to elucidate whether they bind
university faculty conducting research with federal support and for creating potential
grounds for “frivolous challenges and harassment.” Nils Hasselmo & C. Peter Magrath,
AAU/NASULGC Letter to OMB on Proposed Guidelines on Research Data (Aug. 13,
2001), www.aau.edu/research/OMBLtr8.13.01.html.
352. See Nelkin, supra note 344, at 1601 (explaining that “[m]any accusations of
inaccuracy can be traced to reporters’ efforts to present complex material in a readable and
appealing way”).
353. Id.; see Sarah A. Wilcox, Cultural Context and the Conventions of Science
Journalism: Drama and Contradiction in Media Coverage of Biological Ideas About
Sexuality, 20 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 225, 236-38 (2003) (finding that journalists
include sensationalistic, absolutist, and dramatic statements in their stories in order to gain
newspaper space).
354. See C. Neal Stewart, Jr., Press Before Paper—When Media and Science Collide, 21
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 353, 353-54 (2003) (urging journalists not to report scientific
findings before publication in peer-reviewed journals because it is only through such
publication that the data can receive “second tier . . . validation” upon “scrutiny by the
scientific community,” can become open to rebuttal, and can be communicated carefully
and accurately to journalists who are not experts in the field).
355. See Condit, supra note 345, at 1415 (highlighting that journalistic reporting is
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Whites responded well to a particular medication and forty-seven percent
of Blacks reacted similarly to it, may be reported as establishing that there
are unmistakable and dramatic differences between Whites and Blacks with
respect to the illness at issue and its course of treatment. In order to remain
competitive in the market, journalists may sacrifice a degree of integrity for
the sake of creating dramatic headlines by depicting research results as
more promising than they are or skewing data to exaggerate health risks.356
In the alternative, the media may tailor its reporting to its targeted
audience. A recent study revealed that information about breast cancer was
reported differently in Canadian newspapers known to be read by Jews and
those read by other communities.357 The study found that forty-seven
percent of the articles examined in Jewish newspapers identified genetics
as a major risk factor, while only seventeen percent of stories in
newspapers with more general readerships did the same.358 The authors
also found many shortcomings in the way information was conveyed in
both types of newspapers, including inconsistencies, data gaps, and
confusing descriptions.359 If the press modifies its stories to appeal to its
targeted audience’s presumed concerns and interests and distorts
information, it can cause significant harm by inducing readers or viewers to
underestimate health risks or undervalue certain medical choices, including
genetic testing.
Some professional organizations such as the Society of Professional
Journalists and the American Medical Writers Association have developed
their own codes of ethics for journalists writing about science and
medicine.360 These include the principles that journalists “should apply
frequently characterized by an “overly optimistic slant”). But see Bubela & Caulfield, supra
note 348, at 1399 (2004) (examining 627 newspaper articles and finding that that most
articles accurately report the results but nonetheless overemphasize the benefits and
underrepresent risks); Caulfield, supra note 348, at 337 (stating that “in some circumstances,
the media reporting of science is surprisingly accurate and portrays a message created by the
scientific community” but that the message often contains an overly-optimistic, positive
spin, possibly because of growing commercial pressures within the research environment).
356. See L. Donelle et al., Portrayal of Genetic Risk for Breast Cancer in Ethnic and
Non-Ethnic Newspapers, 40 WOMEN & HEALTH 93, 107 (2004) (discussing the possibility
that journalists will exaggerate risks in order to attract readers and noting the pressures
placed on reporters by editors whose sole mission it is to maximize circulation).
357. Id. at 107.
358. Id. at 99. Jews were assumed to be more interested in genetic influences on cancer
because of the BRCA 1/2 genetic abnormality, which is associated with Ashkenazi Jews.
See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (discussing the BRCA1 and BRCA2
alleles).
359. Id. at 107-09; see Laurie Hoffman-Goetz & Daniela B. Friedman, Disparities in the
Coverage of Cancer Information in Ethnic Minority and Mainstream Mass Print Media, 15
ETHNICITY & DISEASE 332, 336-37 (2005) (reporting that “[c]ancer coverage in ethnic and
mainstream newspapers did not accurately reflect the leading causes of cancer death in
Canada”). The authors suggest that cancer data should be collected by minority populations
in Canada so that at-risk populations can be better served and educated. Id.
360. AM. MED. WRITERS ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL WRITERS
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objectivity, scientific accuracy and rigor, and fair balance,”361 that
journalists “[t]est the accuracy of information from all sources,”362 and that
they “[a]void stereotyping by race” or other classifications.363 Although
these ethical codes are not legally binding, every journalist would be wise
to follow them.
Scientists, research institutions, and the media all bear responsibility for
educating the public concerning scientific data.364 If information is
distorted to indicate that there are significant biological differences among
“races” and that some “races” are more diseased than others or less easily
treatable, negative and dangerous stereotypes and prejudices could be
reinforced.365 Furthermore, some may feel justified in discriminating
against particular population groups in the workplace or elsewhere based
on allegedly hard data.366 Finally, readers and viewers may make errors in
seeking medical care and making medical choices based on what they
believe they have learned about risks and treatments for their “race.”
Consequently, all parties must be restrained and fastidious about accuracy
when discussing scientific information, especially that which relates to
attribute-based research and treatments.367
One additional area of concern is direct-to-consumer (“DTC”)
advertising, which is likely to include advertising concerning “raciallytailored” medications, as they become available on the market.368 A robust
body of literature is emerging concerning DTC advertising,369 and an
ASSOCIATION (1994) [hereinafter AMWA CODE], http://www.presscouncils.org/librar
y/USA_medical_writers.doc; SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (1996)
[hereinafter SPJ CODE], http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp; see CODES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS STANDARDS IN BUSINESS, HEALTH, AND LAW 187-90, 194-95, 199201, 266-69 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999) (reproducing codes of ethics promulgated by
the American Society of Journalists and Authors, the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, the Society of Professional Journalists, and the American Hospital Association, all
of which address truth and accuracy requirements).
361. AMWA CODE, supra note 360.
362. SPJ CODE, supra note 360.
363. See id.
364. See Tim Radford, Influence and Power of the Media, 347 THE LANCET 1533, 1533,
1535 (1996) (discussing the role of the media as a source of information for the public).
365. See Condit & Bates, supra note 4, at 102 (underscoring the concern that research
linking “race,” genetics, and health can have the inadvertent and unfortunate consequence of
increasing racism).
366. See supra Part III.B.
367. See Condit, supra note 345, at 1416 (proposing guidance for researchers who
communicate with the media). Condit advises researchers that they “must prepare for such
interviews as carefully as they would prepare for a talk at a scientific conference.” Id.; see
also Eliza Mountcastle-Shah et al., Assessing Mass Media Reporting of Disease-Related
Genetic Discoveries, 24 SCI. COMM. 458, 458 (2003) (developing an instrument to assess the
“content and balance of mass media stories about genetic discoveries . . .”).
368. See Saul, supra note 1 (announcing the approval of BiDil as a drug to treat AfricanAmerican heart failure patients).
369. E.g., Michael C. Allen, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the
Effect of Direct to Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising on the Learned Intermediary
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extensive analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Article.
DTC advertising, however, is another arena that will need to be carefully
watched and addressed if “race-based” therapies become a force in the
marketplace.
CONCLUSION
The medical community is demonstrating a growing interest in “raciallytailored” medical practice and research.370 “Racially-tailored,” however, is
the wrong concept. To the extent that a group approach is appropriate,
health care professionals should be thinking in terms of attribute-based
medicine and taking great care to identify the relevant attributes
correctly.371 “Race” is a concept with no coherent meaning, and disease
vulnerabilities, the course of illness, and treatment responses do not depend
on the shade of one’s skin color or the texture of one’s hair.372 Instead,
medical professionals should focus on far more specific questions about
ancestry and geographic origin, on socioeconomic and environmental
conditions, on health habits, on factors affecting treatment compliance, and
on specific alleles linked to the condition in question.373
Concentrating on the issue of “race” in the therapeutic and research
contexts can lead to medical mistakes, reinforcement of stereotypes,
exacerbation of health disparities, and violation of various antidiscrimination provisions.374 In the words of one commentator, “[t]o use
the rhetoric of science to sell the idea that historical inequity should be
embraced as biological inevitability is an insult to those who value a
common humanity.”375
In order to guard against the dangers of attribute-based medicine, the
FDA and research institutions should subject clinical studies that target
only particular population groups to extensive scrutiny by scientific review
boards and IRBs.376 Health care professionals should avoid making

Doctrine, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 113 (1997); Matthew N. Strawn, Recent Developments in
Direct Consumer Advertising of Attention Disorder Stimulants and Creating Limits to
Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 495 (2003); Ernst R.
Berndt, To Inform or Persuade? Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325 (2005).
370. Condit & Bates, supra note 4.
371. See supra Parts V.A and V.B (delineating recommendations for reviewers and
health care professionals).
372. See supra Part II (examining the meaning of the concept of “race”).
373. See supra Parts V.A and V.B (delineating recommendations for scientific
reviewers, IRBs. and health care professionals).
374. See supra Parts III, IV (describing medical and legal problems associated with
“race-based” medicine).
375. Richard S. Cooper, Race and IQ: Molecular Genetics as Deus ex Machina, 60 AM.
PSYCHOL. 71, 75 (2005).
376. See supra Part V.A.
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treatment decisions based solely on their visual judgment of a patient’s
ancestral origins and should review literature that analyzes all factors
contributing to different disease vulnerabilities and treatment response rates
among patients.377 Furthermore, researchers, research institutions, and the
media, must be constrained and responsible in communicating scientific
data to the public so as not to reinforce stereotypes and prejudice or induce
patients to make misguided decisions about their own care.
Finally, on a national policy level, policy officials should think carefully
about the resources allocated to the development of attribute-based
medicine. As discussed above, many experts link health disparities such as
differences in hypertension rates with non-biological factors, including
diet, environment, exercise, and stress.378 While developing attribute-based
drugs might improve treatment for certain patients, it will not constitute a
panacea that will eliminate all health disparities. Consequently, in light of
limited resources, prudent decisions need to be made concerning funding
allocation between medical research endeavors and other initiatives that
could do as much or more to improve the health status of disadvantaged
minorities. These include work in the areas of education, nutrition,
environment, and job training.379 Despite the appeal of attribute-based
medicine, resources should not be diverted away from projects intended to
diminish socioeconomic injustice, which are at least as important for those
adversely affected by health disparities.380
It is only with careful thought and appropriate precautions that attributebased medicine can become an approach that enhances treatment
opportunities for all human beings and contributes significantly to public
health and welfare.

377. See supra Part V.B.
378. Kahn, supra note 64, at 481.
379. Cf. Kahn, supra note 64, at 481 (lamenting the “longstanding division between the
professions of medicine and public health” that often prevents professionals in both fields
from reaching the best solutions to particular problems).
380. See id. (observing that “environmental, psychosocial, and economic factors” may be
more likely than biological factors to adequately explain “racial” disparities in health).

